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NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN:
FIREARMS DISABILITIES AND THEIR
OCCUPATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Mark M. Stavsky*
INTRODUCTION
The last thing that Thomas Bean expected on the evening he
drove across the border into Mexico for some dinner was that he
would end up staying there involuntarily for the next six months.
When Bean, a firearms dealer by occupation, crossed the border
into Mexico, customs officials there spotted some ammunition in
the back seat of his car.1 He was arrested for and then convicted of
importing ammunition into Mexico. After serving time in a Mexi-
can prison, he was transferred to a federal prison in Texas to serve
out the remainder of his sentence.2 He served a month in federal
prison; after that he served ten months under supervised release
before he was completely freed.' As a convicted felon, Bean lost
both his right to possess firearms and his firearms license.4 He then
petitioned the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF")
to restore his lost rights.5 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) gives the ATF that
authority.6 Unfortunately for Bean, since 1992 Congress has pro-
hibited the ATF from using any of it annual appropriations to in-
vestigate requests for such relief.7 He then sought relief in federal
* Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College
of Law. Scholar-in-Residence, Hebrew Union College-University of Cincinnati
("HUC-UC") Center for the Study of Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems.
The Author wishes to thank Dr. Jonathan Cohen, Professor at Hebrew Union Col-
lege-Jewish Institute of Religion ("HUC-JIR") and Director of the Ethics Center,
for all his support and encouragement during this past year. This Article developed,
in part, out of several discussions in a seminar, entitled "Criminality and Civil Disa-
bilities," that Dr. Cohen and the Author taught to a combined group of rabbinical
students from HUC- JIR and law students from the University of Cincinnati College
of Law. This was a rare and enriching experience, and much of the credit goes to my
students. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my dear friend, Chet Wywialow-
ski (1951-2002).
1. United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584, 585 (2002).
2. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
3. See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
5. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 585.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
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court.8 One of the provisions in the relief statute gave federal
judges the power to review ATF denials of relief.9 Although the
judge had no denial as such to review, he nevertheless found that
the ATF's refusal to review Bean's petition amounted to a "de-
nial."1 After a hearing, the judge granted Bean his requested re-
lief.1' In reviewing the district judge's ruling, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, ignoring the prevailing law in this
area, including its own.' 2 On Dec. 10, 2002, in one of its earliest
decisions of the term, the Supreme Court in the case United States
v. Bean overturned the Fifth Circuit; the Court ruled that a federal
district court has no authority under the relief statute when the
ATF has not acted.13 "Denial" is not the same as inaction. Bean
must now return to his used car business.
Bean's case is compelling for a number of reasons. The district
and circuit court decisions must be accounted for, contrary as they
were to prevailing law. Their decisions were driven in no small
part by the concern for the unjustified imposition of a serious occu-
pational disability upon an otherwise worthy individual, as well as
the denial to him of an opportunity to demonstrate his
worthiness.' 4
Further, an examination of the federal firearms disabilities
scheme, the relief provision, and the appropriations ban reveal that
the current system, which prevents felons like Bean from reenter-
ing their professions, is severely flawed. In particular, the appro-
priations ban has removed the only remaining safe haven for
individuals trapped in a cumbersome process that was already rid-
dled with inefficiency, inconsistency and inequity.
Like other collateral consequences of conviction, occupational
disabilities have received increased attention lately. 5 This is due in
8. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 586.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
10. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 586.
11. See infra notes 121-236 and accompanying text.
12. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 586.
13. See infra notes 237-306 and accompanying text.
14. See Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837-38 (E.D. Tex. 2000), affd
sub nom. Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir.
2001).
15. See generally AMY E. HIRSCH ET AL., EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FAC-
ING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 13-26 (2002), available at http://
www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1022677412.0/docEvery-DoorClosed.pdf (last vis-
ited July 15, 2003); JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMEN-
SIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31-34 (2001), available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from-prison-to-home.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003);
Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic and
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large part to the enormous increase of individuals imprisoned in
state and federal institutions. 6 With approximately 600,000 felons
released annually, occupational and employment disabilities im-
pact an unprecedented number of individuals. 17 These disabilities
can be divided into three groups-unregulated occupational disa-
bilities, regulated occupational disabilities, and secondary or deriv-
ative occupational disabilities. 8 The first group is comprised of
those in which private employers choose not to hire felons on the
basis of fear, animosity, or pique.' 9 The other two types of disabili-
ties are those imposed or derived from law.
Regulated occupational disabilities are comprised of specific
laws that severely hamper the ability of ex-offenders to earn a live-
lihood since they prevent individuals from entering or remaining in
certain professions, occupations,20 and government employment.2'
These laws are endemic.22 They are found in statutes, ordinances,
and even constitutional provisions; their impact leaves many ex-
offenders with little choice other than the pursuit of illegal
activities.23
Lastly, there is a form of occupational disability which results
from the secondary impact of another, non-occupational, type of
disability. For example, a common disability imposed upon persons
convicted of drug offenses is loss of driving privileges for a period
that can extend to several years.24 Such a disability not only pre-
Social Consequences, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
Nov. 2000, at 4-5, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/184253.pdf (last visited
July 15, 2003).
16. See Petersilia, supra note 15, at 2-3.
17. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1.
18. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-27.
19. Recent surveys of employers in five major cities indicate sixty-five percent
would not imply ex-offenders. Petersilia, supra note 15, at 4-5.
20. See generally Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component
of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment
Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 188 (1995).
21. For a state-by-state review of civil disabilities, including restrictions upon pub-
lic employment, see OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996).
22. During the 1970s, one study indicated that there were approximately 2,000
"separate statutory provisions that affect the licensing of persons with an arrest or
conviction record." May, supra note 20, at 193 (citing JAMES W. HUNT ET AL., NAT'L
CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMP. RESTRICTIONS ET AL., LAws, LICENSES AND
THE OFFENDER'S RIGHT TO WORK: A STUDY OF STATE LAWS RESTRICTING THE OC-
CUPATIONAL LICENSING OF FORMER OFFENDERS 9-12 (1973)).
23. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 15, at 31 (discussing the relationship between
employment and recidivism).
24. In Delaware, for example, individuals convicted of drug offenses have their
driving privileges revoked for two years. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177K (2003).
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vents the ex-offender from driving generally, it also prevents him
from working at the many types of jobs, which require him to
drive: these include chauffer, delivery, cabdriver, etc.25 There are
even more attenuated, but nevertheless real, consequences such as
being unable to drive to work where there is no public transport.
Another type of disability is denial of educational loans.2 6 Not
only is the individual denied an opportunity to attend college, a
benefit in itself, but also there is a secondary consequence to this
educational disability-loss of access to employment which re-
quires a higher education background. 7
These derivative occupational disabilities are often more prob-
lematic and insidious than those which specifically exclude individ-
uals from pursuing certain forms of employment. They operate
haphazardly, arbitrarily, and often unintentionally; since only some
felons may be subject to the primary disability, the secondary occu-
pational consequences are based on little more then the luck of the
According to federal law, all states must enact laws that revoke or suspend the
driver's license of any individual convicted of "any drug offense" for at least six
months. Failure to comply results in loss of federal transportation funds. See 23
U.S.C. § 159 (2003). There is an opt-out provision if there is opposition to enactment
of such a law by the governor or state legislature. See Nora V. Demleitner, Collateral
Damage: No Re-Entry For Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2002). "As
of 2001, thirty-three states have expressed opposition to the policy, while seventeen
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have enacted the legislation." Id. at
1037 n.66 (citation omitted).
25. Professor Demleitner refers to these in general terms, calling them "indirect
obstacles." Referring to revocation of driver's licenses, as well as other disabilities,
including firearms, she writes, "Some collateral consequences indirectly affect the em-
ployability of ex-offenders because they make it impossible to fulfill basic job require-
ments." Demleitner, supra note 24, at 1037.
26. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 85-90.
As part of its 1998 reauthorization of Title IV of the Higher Education Act
of 1965, Congress enacted a complicated eligibility restriction applicable to
students who have prior convictions for possession or sale of controlled sub-
stances. Applicants subject to this bar cannot obtain Pell grants or student
loans, which, for low-income students, effectively means a denial of higher
education. Even applicants not technically subject to the bar may be dis-
couraged from applying for financial aid as a result of misinformation, bad
advice, or wrong assumptions about how the new law works.
Id. at 85-86. Depending on the type and number of prior drug crimes, ineligibility can
last as little as one year or it can last indefinitely. Id. at 87.
27. "Studies have shown that individuals who receive higher education while in-
carcerated have a significantly better rate of employment (60-75%) than those who
do not participate in college programs (40%)." THE CENTER ON CRIME, CMTYS. &
CULTURE, OPEN SOC'Y INST., EDUCATION AS CRIME PREVENTION: PROVIDING EDU-
CATION TO PRISONERS 7-8 (Sept. 1977), available at http://www.soros.org/crime/re-
search-brief__2.html (last visited July 15, 2003); "Education increases employment
opportunities for people with criminal records ... ." HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 15, at
86.
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draw. 8 Worse yet, secondary occupational disabilities, by their
very nature are not specific-thus, a single non-occupational disa-
bility can exclude an individual from a number of employment op-
portunities.2 9 By contrast, although occupational disabilities are
legion, they concern specific forms of employment. 30 There may
even be a nexus between the particular felony and the occupational
disability. Finally, while it is debatable whether any thought goes
into the enactment of occupational disability legislation, certainly
little or no consideration is given to the possible secondary conse-
quences. The critical importance of employment to successful re-
entry into society demands that the derivative adverse
consequences of any disabilities need to be carefully considered
before they are imposed.
This is essentially the type of occupational disability faced by in-
dividuals like Thomas Bean.31 Loss of firearm privileges may not,
in general, be as disabling as other types of collateral conse-
quences-e.g., loss of public housing,32 loss of welfare, 33 loss of
child custody3 4-but this loss takes on greater significance when it
impacts an ex-offender's opportunity for employment. Firearms
dealers are not the only individuals for whom loss of weapons priv-
ileges means an end to an occupation.36 There are others, includ-
ing peace officers and security guards.37
This Article will focus on the Bean case from the perspective of
firearms disabilities and loss of occupational license. Part One will
28. Demleitner, supra note 24, at 1037.
29. Id.
30. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-16.
31. One can argue that the occupational disability imposed upon Bean falls some-
where between the two types of disabilities. Federally licensed firearms dealers can-
not have a record of felony convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (d)(I)(B) (2003).
Nevertheless, the reason for his loss of his occupation is that, like every other felon,
he can no longer possess firearms. Furthermore, as with every other felon-except
corporate felons-the ATF is barred from investigating his request for relief under 18
U.S.C. § 925(c).
32. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 41-53.
33. Id. at 27-41.
34. Id. at 53-84.
35. "[A]s ex-offenders are frequently barred from possessing firearms, when their
handling is a prerequisite for employment, ex-offenders are indirectly excluded from
these jobs." Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need For Restrictions
on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 156 (1999).
36. Id.
37. "Among positions that may require the handling of firearms are private secur-
ity services, private investigators, and bodyguards. For other employment, such as
certain night work, the ability to handle a gun may not be a job prerequisite but may
be considered an advantage." Id. at 156 n.53.
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discuss the facts leading to Bean's conviction. Part Two will briefly
outline the history of federal firearms disabilities, the relief statute,
and the all-important appropriations ban. Part Three will analyze
and critique the lower court decisions, in view of the significant
role that Bean's loss of occupation played in their rulings. Finally,
Part Four will: 1) focus on the adverse impact of Congress' decision
to subvert the relief provision; and 2) reflect on the essentially in-
coherent nature of the entire federal firearms disabilities scheme.
PART ONE
When Thomas Bean entered Mexico, he had just left the gun
show in Laredo, Texas, that he had been attending.3 8 He should
have been far more careful in cleaning out his car before he
crossed the border. At the time Bean was arrested, there were al-
ready dozens of Americans languishing in Mexican jails or serving
prison sentences in Mexican penitentiaries for bringing guns and/or
ammunition across the border.39 Mexican gun laws are far more
strict than those in the United States,40 and generally only police
and military personnel are legally entitled to carry guns or possess
ammunition.4 While enforcement of these strict gun laws is de-
signed to combat drug trafficking and armed insurgencies in Mex-
ico,4 2 many Americans caught with weapons while entering Mexico
are there to hunt.4 3 Although legitimate hunters can obtain per-
38. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
39. See News Release, California Department of Transportation, Caltrans Unveils
Effort Educating Motorists of Mexico Gun Law (Aug. 17, 1999), available at http//
www.dot.ca.gov/dist 11/news/99news/44.htm (last visited July 15, 2003); see also Susan
Bosch, Metro Pair Isn't Alone in Mexico Gun Troubles, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS
COURIER, Jan. 20, 1999, available at http://www.wcfcourier.com/metne99/
990120metro.html (last visited July 15, 2003); Mexico Proposes Easing Gun Laws,
JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE, Aug. 17, 1998, at http://www.jointogether.org/gv/news/sum-
maries/print/0,2060,255038,00.html (last visited July 15, 2003).
40. News Release, supra note 39; Small Arms and Domestic Gun Laws, SAWG
Fact Sheets on Small Arms 2001, Small Arms Working Group, at http://www.fas.org/
asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
41. Bosch, supra note 39.
42. The problem created by guns smuggled into Mexico from the United States is
a very serious one. See Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Guns Smuggled into
Mexico Aid Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, reprinted in INT'L ACTION NET-
WORK ON SMALL ARMS (IANSA) NEWS, available at http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/
may_01/us..smuggle.htm (last visited July 15, 2003). In fact, two federally licensed gun
dealers sold scores of weapons in Mexico. Id.
43. For a description of availability of hunting in Mexico, see Hunting in Mexico,
Mexico Online, at http://www.mexonline.com/huntmex.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
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mits to bring their weapons into Mexico, apparently a significant
number of these individuals were unaware of this requirement."
In fact, United States government officials as well as California
officials made concerted efforts to warn motorists heading toward
the U.S.-Mexican border about the dangers of transporting weap-
ons into Mexico." These efforts included distributing thousands of
leaflets, installing highway signs, and establishing a low frequency
AM channel warning of this danger.46 In California, the California
Department of Transportation spent about $18,000 in its "Guns
Into Mexico... Don't Do It" public awareness campaign.4 7 Mexi-
can officials also recognized the importance of this campaign; when
the campaign was first unveiled, the Counsel General of Mexico in
San Diego was one of the attendees.48
Thomas Bean, a resident of Port Arthur, Texas became one more
statistic when he was arrested by Mexican authorities for importing
ammunition. After the gun show in Laredo was over, he crossed
into Nuevo Laredo, Mexico to have dinner.49 Although he told his
associates to remove all guns and ammunition from his Suburban,
someone had inadvertently left approximately 200 rounds of am-
munition in the back of the SUV.50 When they were stopped at the
border crossing, Mexican officials discovered the ammunition. 51
Bean and his assistants were immediately arrested; all but Bean
were soon released. 2 Bean alone was charged with the crime of
introduction of ammunition into the Republic of Mexico, appar-
ently because he owned both the car and ammunition. 3 He was
then immediately taken into custody.54 While being held, Bean
eventually signed a statement in Spanish prepared by the Mexican
officials.55 He could not read, write, or understand Spanish, and
was never provided with an interpreter or an English translation of
44. See id.
45. See News Release, supra note 39; Am. Citizen Servs., Consulate Gen. of the
U.S. of Am.-Tijuana, Mexico, Weapons Are Illegal in Mexico, at http://
www.usembassy-mexico.gov/tijuana/Teacs.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
46. News Release, supra note 39.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 837. The federal district court judge who later heard Bean's petition for
firearms relief determined that "Mexican law requires an accused person to furnish a
statement regarding the crime charged, even if the statement is incriminating. The
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this statement. 6 The document, it turned out, was a confession. 7
After two months in custody, Bean was convicted, 58 allegedly with-
out any formal trial proceeding. He was sentenced to five years
imprisonment, as well as fined.59 Although the facts are far from
clear, Bean did not have an attorney during most of his detention.6 °
At some point, however, he did retain a Mexican CPA to assist
him.61 Bean's conviction became a cause celebre among gun own-
ers in the United States, who were outraged by his arrest and im-
prisonment. 62 They organized a letter campaign directed to then-
Governor George W. Bush.63
Bean served approximately four months in a Mexican prison,64
and then was transferred to LaTuna Penitentiary in Anthony,
arrested person can be charged with a separate offense should the arrested person fail
to make such statement." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 829.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 837 n.7.
61. Id.
62. See Gun Owners of America Fax Alert, Attention Texas Gun Owners: Fellow
Texan in Mexican Jail Needs Your Help! (June 5, 1998), at http://www.gunowners.org/
stx0498.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
63. Id. The June 5, 1998 alert instructed members to send the following form
letter:
The Honorable George W. Bush
Office of the Governor
Box 12428
Austin, TX 78711
Dear Governor Bush:
I am writing to request relief for Thomas Lamar Bean, a resident of Vidor,
Texas. From information supplied to us by some of our Texas members, Mr.
Bean is facing a five-year sentence in a Mexican prison because he is accused
of having entered Mexico with a box containing about $30 worth of ammuni-
tion of assorted calibers.
The box was in open view, and the quantity clearly indicates that there was
no intention on Mr. Bean's part to engage in smuggling ammunition into
Mexico. Mr. Bean is truly an innocent man.
Please use your good offices under the provisions of the prisoner exchange
program, or any other means available to you, to obtain the release of Mr.
Bean. And kindly let me know what you are able to do so I can keep our
members informed.
Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Larry Pratt
Executive Director
Id.
64. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
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Texas65 pursuant to the International Prisoner Transfer Treaty.66
He served approximately one month of his sentence in the peniten-
tiary and approximately another year under supervised release
under the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. 67 On August 30, 1999, Bean was uncon-
ditionally released from his sentence.68
Among the collateral consequences to which Bean was now sub-
ject was his inability to possess, transfer, or import firearms.69 He
could no longer have any weapons in his possession since he was
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.70
The Mexican conviction apparently qualified, since it carried with
it a term of five years in prison.7' Ironically, during the pendency
of Bean's legal troubles, his crime became a far less serious one in
Mexico. 72 It has now become a misdemeanor to import firearms or
ammunition into Mexico, punishable only by a fine.73 The Mexican
legislature was in part reacting to the extensive publicity surround-
65. Id.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100-4115 (2000).
67. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
68. Id.
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). More specifically, anyone convicted in any court of
a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," may not ship or
transport a firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, possess a fire-
arm or ammunition in or affecting commerce, or receive any firearm or ammunition
that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Certain
crimes are specifically excluded: 1) "any Federal or State offenses pertaining to anti-
trust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses
relating to regulation of business practices," Id. § 921(a)(20)(a); and 2) "any State
offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor punishable by a term of
imprisonment of two years or less." Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). See SUSAN KUZMA, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
UPON CONVICTION 15-20 (2000).
70. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
71. Id. at 829. The issue of whether Bean's foreign conviction fell within the fire-
arms disability statute of the Gun Control Act was considered by the district court
judge; he found that it did not. Specifically, the judge ruled that, "A foreign convic-
tion cannot, as a de facto rule, serve as the predicate offense for a prohibition of
firearms privileges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)." Id. at 837. In so ruling, the judge
conceded that the prevailing law was to the contrary. Id. In any event, such a ruling
was an alternative basis for granting Bean his requested relief. The problem with such
a finding, in this context, is that it cannot support a request for relief. If Bean's fire-
arms restrictions could not have been imposed ab initio, then he has no reason to
need or seek relief. Bean did not pursue this particular claim before the Supreme
Court, and, in fact, apparently conceded that the disability provision does apply to
foreign convictions. This is not to say, of course, that the facts surrounding his partic-
ular foreign conviction are irrelevant to a determination of whether or not relief
should be granted.
72. Id. at 838.
73. Id.
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ing the prosecutions and convictions of individuals in circum-
stances similar to Bean's.7 1 Unfortunately for Bean, he was
already branded a felon for purposes of federal firearms disabili-
ties.75 Bean could no longer hunt, collect guns, or hold any occupa-
tion that required him to possess or have access to a weapon.76 He
could no longer, for example, be a corrections officer or a security
guard. Since many other types of occupations often require that
the individual be armed, such as a jeweler or courier, he could not
engage in these professions either. More to the point, because he
could no longer possess, transport, or import firearms, he could no
longer retain his firearms license.77 His ability to engage in his oc-
cupation was gone.
PART Two
In his effort to renew his gun dealer's license, Bean needed to
enter the rather Byzantine world of federal firearms disabilities. It
has a long and complex and controversial history, some of which
Bean may have been aware of as a licensed gun dealer.
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Firearms Act, which initi-
ated federal regulation of interstate firearms traffic; it provided, in-
ter alia, that individuals convicted of "crimes of violence" could not
receive firearms transported in interstate commerce.78 Over the
years, this prohibition was expanded to include virtually all felo-
nies, i.e., crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment over one
year. 79 The current law, in force since 1961, states that it is a fed-
eral crime for "any person... who has been convicted in any court
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year... [to] possess... any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. '"80
74. Id. The trial judge ascribed this change in the law to the publicity surrounding
Bean's arrest and conviction. Id.; see News Release, supra note 39. The timing seems
right. An article in the San Antonio Express-News reported, on August 12, 1998, that
such a proposed change in Mexican law had a good chance of passage. Id. At that
time, Bean had already been convicted and was three months into his sentence. Bean,
89 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
75. Ironically, because Bean had already been convicted, he could not benefit
from the change in the law which cases such as his may have prompted.
76. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 829, 837.
77. Id. at 829-30.
78. Brief of Amicus Curiae Violence Policy Center at 3, United States v. Bean, 123
S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-704).
79. Id. In 1947, for example, the prohibition was expanded to include the felonies
of burglary, house breaking, and assault. Id. at 3 n.3.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2003).
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In 1965, Congress provided relief from this disability in cases
where the ex-offender "will not be likely to act in a manner dan-
gerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to the public interest."'" The genesis for this relief
provision was apparently the conviction of Olin Mathieson Corpo-
ration-the parent corporation of firearms manufacturer
Winchester-for a felony involving a kickback scheme in dealings
with foreign governments. 82 Without relief from the firearms disa-
bility statute, Winchester would have been out of business since it
would no longer be able to ship firearms.83 Congress, ever mindful
of its corporate constituencies, quite correctly decided that relief in
such cases as this would not be contrary to public interest. 84
Despite its apparent genesis in protecting corporations from the
consequences of a conviction upon its ability to continue in the
firearms trade, the relief provision applied not only to corpora-
tions, but to individuals as well. 85 Twenty years later, in 1986, Con-
81. Brief of Amicus Curiae Violence Policy Center at 3, Bean (No. 01-704).
82. Id. at 4. For a more in-depth discussion of the role played by Olin Mathieson's
dilemma in the enactment of the relief provision, and its significance upon the mean-
ing of that provision, see Ryan Laurence Nelson, Note, Rearming Felons: Federal Ju-
risdiction Under § 925c, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 551, 565-66. Apparently, the court
trying Olin Mathieson stayed its judgment of conviction until Congress had an oppor-
tunity to change the law. David Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A His-
torical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 598 n.73 (1987); see United
States v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 368 F.2d 525, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1966).
83. See Nelson, supra note 82, at 565-66.
84. Id.
85. Id. This is, of course, of enormous practical significance because far more indi-
viduals-the bulk of felons, after all-can be expected to take advantage of the relief
provision than corporations. This fact also raises the important issue of whether Con-
gress merely wanted to bail out Winchester and other corporations finding themselves
threatened with possible extinction, or actually intended to provide individuals gener-
ally with a means to seek relief. The two purposes do not conflict because by its
terms, the relief provision furthers both-however, there still remains the question as
to the primary impetus of the legislation. Although one commentator takes the ap-
proach that the true purpose was to provide individuals with relief, he appears to
ignore the role that the Olin Mathieson case played in the creation of the precursor to
current § 925(c). He explains the genesis as follows:
The legislative history behind the relief provisions shows that Congress rec-
ognized that not all felonies are created equal. Beginning with the original
relief provision in 1965, it appears that Congress believed the strict applica-
tion of the Federal Firearms Act worked to disadvantage some individuals
who posed no danger to the public by reason of firearm possession. The
Committee on Ways and Means submitted a report to the House of Repre-
sentatives which stated in part:
Under present law, conviction of a felony (offense punishable by impris-
onment for more than 1 year) automatically deprives the convicted person
(including a corporation) of the right to have any dealing with any firearm
or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. No consideration can
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gress expanded this provision in several significant ways.86 It now
included a specific provision allowing a petitioner who was denied
relief to obtain judicial review of the Secretary of the Treasury's
adverse decision.87 In addition, persons convicted of crimes involv-
ing firearms or violators of the Gun Control Act of 1968,88 as well
as others who were, until then, ineligible for disability relief, were
now entitled to petition for it. 9 Responsibility for administering
this provision, along with all other matters pertaining to firearms,
had been delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. 90
Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), provides:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transport-
ing, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make application
to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Fed-
eral laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, ship-
be given to any circumstances which might cause a judge to properly miti-
gate or even suspend the punishment. Nor may consideration be given to
the fact that the crime might be wholly unrelated to firearms and to the
disability imposed by the Federal Firearms Act.
Thereafter, Congress amended the Federal Firearms Act by providing a re-
lief provision. The relief provision incorporated these concerns expressed by
the House Report. However, instead of the judiciary making the determina-
tion on whether to grant relief, Congress empowered the Secretary of the
Treasury with the task. In addition, the relief provision provided the Secre-
tary with a broad and subjective standard for either granting or denying re-
lief. This suggests that originally Congress was relying upon the Secretary's
investigatory capabilities and its expertise to determine whether an applicant
should be granted relief.
Ronald Griffin, Obtaining Relief From Federal Firearms Disabilities: Did Congress
Really Suspend the Relief Available to Felons Through Appropriations Acts?, 23
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 977, 995-96 (1998). While one can argue that differing views
over the basis of the original relief provision is much ado about nothing, for both
Nelson and Griffin, it matters greatly, indeed. This difference forms a crucial element
of their divergent views of the impact of the appropriations ban upon access to federal
court review.
86. Griffin, supra note 85, at 982-83. Congress passed the Firearm Owners Protec-
tion Act ("FOPA"), a rather politically charged name for legislation, otherwise known
as the McLure Volkmer Act. Brief of Amicus Curiae Violence Policy Center at 3,
United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-704). According to the executive
director of the Violence Policy Center, the Act was drafted by the National Rifle
Association. Id.
87. Griffin, supra note 85, at 983.
88. Id. at 982-83.
89. Brief of Amicus Curiae Violence Policy Center at 3, Bean (No. 01-704). "This
Act amended Section 925(c) to permit felons who had been convicted of crimes in-
volving a firearm, had been committed involuntarily to a mental institution, or had
violated the Gun Control Act of 1968 to petition ATF for restoration of their firearms
privileges." Id. at 4.
90. Griffin, supra note 85, at 1.
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ment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the
Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfac-
tion that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the ap-
plicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and
that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the pub-
lic interest. Any person whose application for relief from disa-
bilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition with the
United States District Court for the district in which he resides
for a judicial review of such denial. The court may in its discre-
tion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would re-
sult in a miscarriage of justice. A licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector conducting
operations under this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], who
makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred under
this chapter, shall not be barred by such disability, from further
operations under his license pending final action on an applica-
tion for relief filed pursuant to this section. Whenever the Secre-
tary grants relief to any person pursuant to this section he shall
promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of such action,
together with the reasons therefore.
While this relief statute has never been officially repealed, since
1993 Congress has provided a specific provision in its annual
budget appropriations that prohibits the ATF91 from utilizing any
of its funds to process requests from those seeking relief pursuant
to the terms of the statute.92 "[N]one of the funds appropriated
therein shall be available to investigate or act upon applications for
relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 925(c). ' 93
This appropriations ban continued to be in effect, renewed on an
annual basis, up through the present. The only change occurred in
the year following its initial passage when an exception was carved
out for corporate felons.94 Winchester and other corporations in
similar straits would still have recourse to § 925(c) relief.
The decision to impose this budgetary constraint upon the ATF's
ability to perform the duties prescribed by § 925(c) did not occur in
a vacuum. Not coincidentally, the Violence Policy Center
91. The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated his authority to the Director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
92. Nelson, supra note 82, at 555-56.
93. Treasury Department Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 102-393, 106
Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992).
94. Griffin, supra note 85, at 983. "However, Congress did reinstate funding for
the BATF to act upon applications made by corporations in 1994 and has continued to
do so through the present." Id. (citations omitted).
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("VPC"), a gun control advocacy and research organization, 95 had
just released a report detailing how this provision is both costly to
the government and places individuals at considerable risk from
felons who have had their firearms disabilities removed.96
The study, entitled "Putting Guns Back Into Criminals' Hands,"
provided extensive information regarding the way in which 18
U.S.C. § 925 (c) has been applied.9 Referring to this relief provi-
sion as "A Convicted Felon's Second Chance Club," the VPC was
extremely critical of efforts to allow felons to regain their right to
possess firearms.98
The VPC compiled some extremely enlightening data. Between
1985 and 1990, the ATF processed more than 22,000 applications
from felons seeking relief from their firearms disabilities. 99 Once
an application was received, it had to go through a rigorous process
of investigation by ATF investigators.'00 Between forty and fifty
ATF employees were assigned this task on a full-time basis at a
yearly cost of several million dollars. 10' This cost varied from a low
95. In its own words, the VPC states that it is "a national nonprofit organization
working to reduce firearms violence through research, education, and advocacy."
Brief of Amicus Curiae Violence Policy Center at 1, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct.
584 (2002) (No. 01-704). More precisely:
The Violence Policy Center is at the forefront of organizations working to
reduce firearms violence in our nation. To this end, VPC analyzes a wide
range of current firearm issues and provides information to policymakers,
journalists, scholars, public health professionals, grassroots advocates, and
members of the general public. Since its founding in 1988, VPC has released
more than 60 studies and books which have helped shape firearms legislation
and policy on the federal, state, and local levels while increasing public un-
derstanding of firearms violence as a public health issue. In addition, VPC's
Litigation Project, established in 2001, has filed amicus curiae briefs in pre-
cedent-setting cases in the federal and state trial and appellate courts. As a
result of its unique expertise, VPC is often relied on and cited by national
news outlets and other organizations. Its staff, which includes lawyers and
health policy analysts, are nationally recognized experts on firearms vio-
lence, firearms manufacture, federal firearms law and the agencies empow-
ered to enforce such laws (such as the Department of Justice and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms), and firearms litigation.
Id.
96. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., PUTrING GUNS BACK INTO CRIMINALS' HANDS: 100
CASE STUDIES OF FELONS GRANTED RELIEF FROM DISABILITY UNDER FEDERAL
FIREARMS LAWS (1992), at http://www.vpc.org/studies/reliefcont.htm (last visited July
15, 2003).
97. See generally id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Section One: A Convicted Felons' Second Chance Club (1992), at http://
www.vpc.org/studies/reliefone.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
100. Id.
101. Id.
1772
2003] NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN 1773
of $2,516,000 (in 1986) to a high of $4,270,000 (in 1991).102 Approx-
imately one-third of the applicants were granted relief, one-third
denied relief, and one-third withdrew their applications while they
were pending.10 3 Some applicants granted relief went on to re-of-
fend.10 4 Among the group granted relief by the ATF, the VPC
found sixty-nine cases where felons subsequently committed crimes
again.10 5
The VPC report also focused on one hundred specific cases-a
random sampling of felons who had been granted relief by the
ATF.10 6 Of the hundred, many of them committed serious, as well
as, violent crimes.0 7 One commentator seemed so impressed with
these statistics that he relied upon them to provide support for his
position that firearms relief had little to recommend it.
Giving guns to felons is not a politically popular position and it
draws an emotional response from many, including the Violence
Policy Center ("VPC"), a public interest organization, which de-
scribes the "relief from disabilities" program as a "second
chance club" supported by the National Rifle Association. The
VPC says that of one hundred felons who had been granted re-
lief by the Secretary, five had convictions for sexual assault,
eleven had burglarized, thirteen had been convicted of narcotics
charges, and four had committed homicide. These kinds of sta-
tistics do not make for good public relations, and provide strong
policy arguments against allowing government sanctioned
",relief."' 8
The national press was outraged. 10 9 Members of Congress re-
sponded as well. 1 0 On February 27, 1992, Representatives Larry
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Section Three: 100 Case Studies of Felons Granted Relief From Disability,
at http://www.vpc.org/studies/reliefthree/htm (last visited July 15, 2002).
107. Id.
108. Nelson, supra note 82, at 576.
109. Substantial pressure developed to terminate the ATF program. See, e.g., Edito-
rial: Felon Gun Program Should Be Disbanded, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 1, 1992, at 31
("It is outrageous in the extreme for the federal government to shell out millions of
dollars helping convicted felons to get their hands on guns-legally!-under a pro-
gram that offers 'relief' to felons with the 'disability' of being unable to own weap-
ons."); Morning Edition: BATF Felon Gun Program A Campaign Issue? (NPR radio
broadcast, July 30, 1992) (reporting that the ATF Director was "embarrassed by the
fact that his bureaucrats have to spend $ 4 million of taxpayer's [sic] money every year
to determine which felons should be allowed to carry guns and which should not").
Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-704).
110. The following comments were made by Senator Lincoln Chafee:
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Smith and Ed Feighan along with Senators Paul Simon and Frank
Lautenberg introduced legislation to prohibit the ATF from using
its appropriated funds to investigate request for relief under
§ 925(c).' 1' This provision has been contained ever since in every
appropriations bill passed by Congress.112
As a result of the appropriations bans, no individual ex-offend-
ers could obtain relief from the ATF of their federal firearms disa-
bilities." 3 When petitions were submitted to the ATF pursuant to
§ 925(c), and the regulations setting out the proper procedure for
doing so," 4 the ATF responds that although federal law "provides
Dozens of convicted felons who have had their gun rights reinstated have
been rearrested on new charges, including attempted murder, robbery, and
child molestation.
This program [§ 925(c)'s relief provision] just does not make any sense. At a
time when gun violence is exacting terrible costs upon our society, it seems
absolutely crystal clear to me that the government's time and money would
be far better spent trying to keep guns out of the hands of convicted felons,
not helping them regain access to firearms.
I am pleased to note that the Appropriations Subcommittee has come to this
same conclusion, and has stipulated in the bill that no appropriated funds
may be used to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal
firearms disabilities.
Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 138
CONG. REC. S13238 (1992)).
111. See id. at 227-29.
112. See id. at 218 n.3.
113. Brief for Respondent at 7, Bean (No. 01-704).
114. 27 C.F.R. § 478.144 (2003) states in pertinent part:
(a) Any person may make application for relief from the disabilities under
section 922 (g) and (n) of the Act (see § 478.32).
(b) An application for such relief shall be filed, in triplicate, with the Director.
It shall include the information required by this section and such other
supporting data as the Director and the applicant deem appropriate.
(c) Any record or document of a court or other government entity or offi-
cial required by this paragraph to be furnished by an applicant in sup-
port of an application for relief shall be certified by the court or other
government entity or official as a true copy. An application shall
include:
(1) In the case of an applicant who is an individual, a written statement
from each of 3 references, who are not related to the applicant by
blood or marriage and have known the applicant for at least 3 years,
recommending the granting of relief-
(2) Written consent to examine and obtain copies of records and to re-
ceive statements and information regarding the applicant's back-
ground, including records, statements and other information
concerning employment, medical history, military service, and crimi-
nal record;
(4) In the case of an applicant having been convicted of a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, a copy of the
indictment or information on which the applicant was convicted, the
1774
2003] NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN 1775
the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to grant relief from
this disability, since October 1992, ATF's annual appropriations
has prohibited the expending of any funds to investigate or act
upon application for relief. 115
PART THREE
That was the response Thomas Bean received from the ATF
when he sought relief in order to regain his ability to possess fire-
arms as well as regain his license. 6 In addition, the ATF in-
structed Bean to "contact their office if and when Congress lifts the
restrictions. 11 7 Like others in the same boat,1 8 Bean filed suit in
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas seek-
ing review of the ATF's action (or, rather, inaction) pursuant to the
judicial review provisions contained in the Act. 19
judgment of conviction or record of any plea of nolo contendere or
plea of guilty or finding of guilt by the court, and any pardon, ex-
punction, setting aside or other record purporting to show that the
conviction was rendered nugatory or that civil rights were restored;
(d) The Director may grant relief to an applicant if it is established to the
satisfaction of the Director that the circumstances regarding the disability,
and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. The
Director will not ordinarily grant relief if the applicant has not been dis-
charged from parole or probation for a period of at least 2 years. Relief
will not be granted to an applicant who is prohibited from possessing all
types of firearms by the law of the State where such applicant resides.
Id. (emphasis added).
115. Brief for Respondent at 7, Bean (No. 01-704).
116. Pursuant to Section 925(c), respondent filed an application with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury for permission to possess firearms and to regain his
license as a firearms dealer. As required by the applicable regulation (27
C.F.R. § 178.144), the application detailed respondent's personal history,
and the circumstances of his conviction. Respondent also attached letters
from two local Chiefs of Police, the local Sheriff, a local City Marshal, and a
State Judge, each attesting to respondent's good character and suitability to
possess firearms." ATF, however, did not grant respondent the relief he re-
quested. By letter, ATF advised respondent that, although federal law "pro-
vides the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to grant relief from
this disability," "since October 1992, ATF's annual appropriation has pro-
hibited the expending of any funds to investigate or act upon applications for
relief."
Id.
117. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
118. See infra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
119. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
In order to understand the context in which Bean was decided by
the district court, it is helpful to consider the prevailing judicial
opinions regarding the effect of the appropriations ban upon the
viability of the review provision contained in the relief statute. At
the time Bean filed his petition, a number of United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal had already held that federal district courts had
no subject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition for relief under
the judicial review provisions of § 925(c). 20 The Ninth,' 2' Tenth 22
and, most significantly the Fifth Circuit 123 encompassing Texas all
agreed on that point. Only the Third Circuit12 4 supported the no-
tion that judicial review was available despite the appropriations
ban. 125 The majority usually gave one of two reasons for its rulings.
One reason was that because appropriations were specifically de-
nied the ATF to investigate petitions from felons seeking relief
under § 925(c), Congress had implicitly suspended the relief provi-
sion.126 The other reason was that mere failure by the ATF to con-
120. See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
121. See Burtch v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. See Owens v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997).
123. See United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1996).
124. See Rice v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 710 (3d Cir.
1995).
125. In Pontarelli v. United States Department of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216, 229-30 (3d
Cir. 2002), in which the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned the Rice decision,
the court quoted from Senator Paul Simon's strong criticism of Rice shortly after it
was decided:
This misguided decision [referring to Rice] could flood the courts with felons
seeking the restoration of their gun rights, effectively shifting from ATF to
the courts the burden of considering these applications. Instead of wasting
taxpayer money and the time of ATF agents[,] which could be much better
spent on important law enforcement efforts ... we would now be wasting
court resources and distracting the courts from consideration of serious
criminal cases.
Fortunately, [McGill] found that congressional intent to prohibit any Federal
relief-either through ATF or the courts-is clear....
Given this conflict in the circuit courts, we should clarify our original and
sustaining intention. The goal of this provision has always been to prohibit
convicted felons from getting their guns back-whether through ATF or the
courts. It was never our intention to shift the burden to the courts.
.... It made no sense for ATF to take agents away from their important law
enforcement work, and it makes even less sense for the courts, which have
no experience or expertise in this area, to be burdened with this unnecessary
job. Let me make this point perfectly clear: It was never our intent, nor is it
now, for the courts to review a convicted felon's application for firearm privi-
lege restoration.
Id. at 229-30 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S10320-21).
126. See Griffin, supra note 85, at 983-89.
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sider a felon's petition for relief was not tantamount to a
"denial"-the necessary precondition set out in the relief provision
for judicial review.127
Bean's petition was heard by United States District Court Judge
Joe Fisher. Judge Fisher was already familiar with Bean's predica-
ment in Mexico. When Bean was transferred from Mexico to the
United States to serve out the remainder of his sentence, Judge
Fisher was assigned to his case. After Bean served approximately
one month in a United States penitentiary, it was Judge Fisher who
ordered that he be placed on supervised release. After ten months
of supervised release, the judge released him outright. 128 Judge
Fisher had developed a colorful reputation in his forty years on the
bench.1
29
District Judge Fisher ruled in Bean's favor. Ignoring his own cir-
cuit's four-year-old precedent explicitly denying jurisdiction in
these types of cases, the judge ruled that the district court had juris-
diction to consider Bean's petition,1 30 and granted him the re-
quested relief after a hearing.1 3 1 The judge found that Congress
did not repeal or suspend § 925(c), but only ATF's involvement in
the process. 32 He relied on Rice v. United States, Department of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,33 the only circuit decision up-
holding relief despite the appropriations ban.1 3 1 In Rice, the Third
127. Id. at 987.
128. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, United States v. Bean 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No.
01-704).
129. Judge Fisher served for forty years on the federal bench after being ap-
pointed by a reluctant President Eisenhower in 1959. He was reported to be
a very fair and principled jurist, but his tenure was not without controversy.
Judge Fisher was named one of the best trial judges in the nation and dis-
played his principles both on and off the bench. In 1979, he ignored a presi-
dential order requiring air-conditioning systems in federal buildings to run at
no lower than eighty degrees, ordering his set at no higher than seventy-four.
He clashed with the media on access to his courtroom during certain testi-
mony and also with civil rights activists fighting for broader desegregation
orders. He also presided over the landmark case allowing workers a cause
of action against asbestos manufacturers for their injuries, which was upheld
by the Fifth Circuit. Judge Fisher died just four months after deciding Bean
at the tender age of ninety.
Nelson, supra note 82, at 561 n.87 (citing Kevin Carboy, Judge Opened Door For
Injured Workers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 20, 2000, at Al).
130. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 839 (E.D. Tex. 2000). It is not much
of a stretch to suggest that the court's decision concerning jurisdiction was connected
to the particular circumstances of Bean's case.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 831.
133. 68 F.3d 702 (3d Cir 1995).
134. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
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Circuit held that Congress neither repealed § 925(c)1,1 35 nor pre-
cluded a federal district court from reviewing a request for relief.136
The Third Circuit decision notwithstanding, Judge Fisher no
doubt felt compelled to explain the reasons that his own circuit's
ruling that judicial review was unavailable had been wrongly de-
cided. This he did, by arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision in
McGill made too much of the legislative history of the appropria-
tions ban, and too little of the legislative history underlying the re-
lief provision itself.137 In McGill, the court relied upon statements
made during House and Senate committee discussions regarding
the problems inherent in granting relief to felons. 138
Judge Fisher went beyond the legislative history of the appropri-
ations ban to consider the history of the relief provision itself. 139
He found that as early as 1965, Congress was concerned that there
was no individual consideration available to those felons who
should not be burdened by firearms disabilities; 4 ° therefore, Con-
gress adopted the relief provision. 4 ' Judge Fisher stated rather
pointedly (almost critically) that the decision of whether to grant
relief was relegated to an agency instead of a trial judge. 4 2
After his review of the legislative history of the relief provision,
the judge concluded the following:
135. Rice, 68 F.3d at 707.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 706-09.
138. For example, the McGill court quoted the following Appropriations Commit-
tee report:
Under the relief procedure, ATF officials are required to determine whether
a convicted felon, including persons convicted of violent felonies or serious
drug offenses, can be entrusted with a firearm. After ATF agents spend
many hours investigating a particular applicant[,] they must determine
whether or not that applicant is still a danger to public safety. This is a very
difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for
innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made. The Committee believes
that the approximately 40 man-years spent annually to investigate and act
upon these investigations and applications would be better utilized to crack
down on violent crime. Therefore, the Committee has included language in
the bill which prohibits the use of funds for ATF to investigate and act upon
applications from relief from Federal firearms disabilities.
United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting S. Rep. No. 353, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1992)). The McGill court found that "[t]his report expresses con-
cern over: (1) use of limited valuable resources for investigating these difficult cases
and (2) consequences to innocent citizens if ATF makes a mistake and grants relief to
a felon from his firearm disabilities." Id.
139. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
140. Id. at 832-33.
141. Id. at 833.
142. Id.
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(1) Congress realized that not all persons convicted of felonies
should be denied firearms privileges forever; (2) Congress pro-
vided the ATF with the ability to reinstate firearms privileges;
and (3) Congress intended the judiciary to give the final word on
the appropriateness of a denial by the ATF. 143
Judge Fisher then turned his attention to the appropriations ban.
He referred to a number of Congressional concerns expressed in
various committee reports to support his contention that the legis-
lative history surrounding the enactment of the ban was conflict-
ing."' Judge Fisher conceded there is support for the claim that
the ban was designed to keep firearms out of the hand of felons. 45
There are other statements, however, indicating that Congress was
primarily concerned with "the ATF's inefficient and wasteful ad-
ministrative review process rather than a desire to curb the availa-
bility of relief itself."' 46
Judge Fisher concludes that any analysis of legislative history re-
lating to the appropriations ban reveals little about its underlying
purpose.147 In any event, he suggests, because the appropriations
ban undermines the still valid relief provision, courts need to be
particularly cautious in utilizing legislative history to give such a
ban its broadest possible interpretation.148 Particularly since the
committee reports express various, if not conflicting,149 purposes,
143. Id.
144. Id. at 835.
145. Id. at 834.
146. Id.
147. Id.
It depends whose side you represent as to which committee report you
choose to employ and which committee report you choose to ignore. And in
reality, committee reports are not an authoritative interpretation of what the
statute meant, nor an authoritative expression of what that Congress in-
tended .... In this Court's opinion, the legislative history on the issue is far
from "clear." If various district and appellate courts read the exact same
legislative history and come to different conclusions (as the courts do on this
issue), then it is this Court's opinion that the legislative history is far from
"clear."
Id. at 835 (citation omitted).
148. Id.
149. There is plenty of conflicting legislative history regarding this issue. Ulti-
mately, the Court recognizes that an advocate can find an abundance of leg-
islative history to support his position. The Court believes that the prudent
thing to do is to focus in on language of the statute. After reviewing the
pages and pages of committee notes, senate reports, and "hearings before
subcommittees of committees," the Court reminded itself that statutory in-
terpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. And if the lan-
guage of the statute is clear, "that is the end of the matter, and the court
must give effect to [the] unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
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Judge Fisher instructs that the use of such reports to interpret the
limits of the appropriations ban renders that effort a "textbook
case on why the courts should be hesitant to use legislative history
to suspend any substantive right which is expressly available in
statutes.'
150
Given Judge Fisher's finding that legislative history is not con-
trolling with respect to the meaning of the appropriations ban, he
asserts that: 1) despite the McGill court's assertion to the con-
trary,15' judges are quite capable of determining whether or not to
grant a felon relief from firearms disabilities; 152 and 2) failure by
the ATF to act on a petition for relief satisfies the statutory precon-
dition necessary for the courts to intercede. 53 Judge Fisher was
unequivocal in claiming that judges are as capable, if not more so,
as the ATF in making the initial determination as to whether a
felon deserves to have his weapons rights restored. 54 With respect
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. The McGill Court is concerned that the judiciary is not a proper forum for
determining whether applicants "are likely [to] act in a manner dangerous to public
safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest."
Id. at 835-36 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 836.
153. Id.
154. Id.
[T]his Court believes that courts are capable of deciding whether to grant or
deny an individual's relief from disabilities request. As in the case now
before this Court, the burden would be on the applicant to submit evidence
that he would not act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. This evi-
dence would include such things as the applicant's record, reputation, and
the underlying reason for the disability. In addition, the court could require
the applicant to submit additional evidence before making its determination
on whether to grant relief.
Id. Judge Fisher also found that judicial involvement would solve all the problems
that were raised in the various Congressional committee meetings:
Moreover, allowing a court to grant the relief solves several concerns ex-
pressed by Congress and the circuit courts. First, it would shift the financial
burden from the government to the applicant. As in this case, the applicant
would be responsible for paying court costs and attorneys fees. Second, in-
stead of the ATF conducting investigations on the applicant, the applicant
would have to secure all the necessary evidence in order to receive relief.
And, if the court deems more evidence is needed, it will be up to the appli-
cant to secure such evidence. Third, a court is a better-suited forum for de-
ciding these issues because it is adjudicative in nature. In addition, if the
court needs to know how the ATF had conducted its investigations in the
past, this information is available in the Code of Federal Regulations and
case law. Courts can decide relief questions without the need of ATF exper-
tise, and if investigative work needs to be done, the applicant himself would
have to conduct it.
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to the requirement that a "denial" by the ATF needs to precede
judicial review, the judge was convinced that inaction by the ATF
(due to the ban) constitutes a de facto denial. 155 He anticipates the
argument that because § 925(c) requires that the administrative
remedy must first be exhausted before judicial review is available,
the absence of a ruling by the ATF constitutes failure to exhaust. 156
Exhaustion is excused, he states, under the principle that no ex-
haustion is necessary where it would be "wholly futile and inade-
quate due to lack of appropriations.' 15 7
Thereafter, the district court concluded its opinion by describing
the hearing it conducted to determine, pursuant to the judicial re-
view provision of § 925(c), whether Bean was entitled to restora-
tion of his firearms privileges and dealer's license. 58 In this type of
setting, however, actual "judicial review" of the ATF's failure to
act is rather hampered since there was nothing available for the
court to review.15 9 Although § 925(c) states that "additional evi-
dence" (over and above that collected by the ATF) can be admit-
ted by the reviewing judge "where failure to do so would result in a
miscarriage of justice,' 160 at Bean's hearing the "additional evi-
dence" was the only evidence the court heard.161 Since no ATF
investigation occurred (thanks to the appropriations ban), the onus
was on Bean to produce sufficient evidence to persuade the court
of his fitness for relief.162
At the hearing, Bean introduced both live testimony and affida-
vits. 163 Briefly, the court heard testimony from several law en-
forcement officials; most significantly, an ATF agent testified that
Bean was a "cooperative [firearms] licensee [and maintained] ex-
cellent records.' 1 64 The Police Chief of Port Arthur, Texas, also
testified as to Bean's reputation as a responsible firearms dealer.1 65
Id. (citations omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 837.
158. Id. at 838-40.
159. See supra note 154, for Judge Fisher's view of the court's role when there is no
ATF record to review.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
161. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
163. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 838-39.
164. Id. at 839.
165. Id.
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Other members of the community testified to his "trustworthi-
ness," and "good character." '166
Affidavits in support of his petition came from what appear to be
unimpeachable sources. They included supportive statements from
two chiefs of police, a city marshal, an assistant district attorney,
and a clergyman. 167
Judge Fisher concluded that Bean "satisfied his burden to this
court in establishing that he 'will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety' and that 'the granting of relief will not
be contrary to the public interest.' ,168
Of all the judges that considered the Bean case, Judge Fisher was
the one most familiar with the circumstances of Bean's Mexican
conviction as well as his general reputation. 69 This seems to have
worked to Bean's advantage. It would seem that the judge had a
personal interest in seeing that Bean was treated fairly. Unfortu-
nately for Judge Fisher, the prevailing law in the Circuits-as well
as his own-was not favorable to Bean.17° Nevertheless, Judge
Fisher stretched the relief provision to its breaking point in order
to provide the relief to which he believed Bean was entitled.' 7' It is
hard to take issue with the conclusion that returning Bean's license
would not be "dangerous to public safety." The witnesses who tes-
tified in his favor read like a "who's who" of Texas law
enforcement.
In fact, during oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Bean's
attorney, Thomas Goldstein, informed the Court that the govern-
ment conceded Bean's fitness for relief.172 This claim was never
challenged.173 Then, while engaged in a colloquy concerning
whether the appearance by the United States at Bean's court hear-
ing itself constitutes a violation of the appropriations ban, Gold-
stein stated, "I think it's very important to recognize that this case
has proceeded until today on the understanding of the parties that
the evidence about Mr. Bean's entitled relief was overwhelming.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 870.
169. Judge Fisher was the district court judge who had jurisdiction over Bean's
criminal case while he was serving his Mexican sentence in the federal penitentiary.
Judge Fisher also oversaw Bean's supervised release and released him unconditionally
after approximately ten months. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1996).
171. See Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 838-40.
172. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584
(No. 01-704) (Oct. 14, 2002).
173. Id.
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Six chiefs of police, a priest, a local. . ." when one of the Justices 174
cut him off by stating, "I don't know that that's an argument, I
mean, I concede that.... ,175 No one, it seems, considered Bean a
threat had he been able to retain his firearms privileges and thus
his license.
It is difficult to imagine that if Bean had not made as strong a
case for relief, Judge Fisher would have determined as a prelimi-
nary matter that he had jurisdiction to hear the case, particularly in
view of all the precedents to the contrary. Had Bean been a multi-
ple armed robber, for example, the Judge could have easily dis-
posed of this case by merely citing McGill. It would be entirely
consistent with Fisher's expressed view of his obligation under the
relief provision to assert jurisdiction over the petition for relief,
and then deny it on the facts. It is difficult to imagine that he
would do so. The facts of this case, it appears, determined the
meaning of the law. A more generous view is that the circum-
stances of the Bean case demonstrated that Congress could not
have possibly intended for the appropriations ban to cause an indi-
vidual like Bean a permanent disability.
In assuming jurisdiction, Judge Fisher ignored the mandate of
the Fifth Circuit, which may be forgivable if he was right.176 But he
was not. At the same time that he criticized the McGill court for
giving too much weight to ambiguous legislative history, Judge
Fisher himself was presenting a less than complete account of rele-
vant congressional history. 77
One commentator was particularly critical of Judge Fisher's own
failure to consider legislative history which conflicted with the
judge's own analysis, thereby weakening his argument that the re-
lief provision gives him the jurisdiction to entertain Bean's request
for relief.178 Judge Fisher placed great emphasis upon the creation
of a relief provision as a way by which Congress ameliorated the
harsh effects of the firearms disability scheme upon individuals
who would pose no threat if they are able to retain their weap-
ons.179 Although he relied heavily upon statements made to that
174. Id. at 30-31. From a reading of the transcript, which does not identify the par-
ticular Justice asking the question, it appears the question was asked by either Justice
Kennedy or Justice Breyer. The distinction is inconsequential.
175. Id. at 31.
176. See generally United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1996).
177. See Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
178. See Nelson, supra note 82, at 567.
179. See Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
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effect in 1965, when the relief provision was first enacted,'180 how-
ever, surprisingly he never referred to the alternative or supple-
mental explanation for the passage of the relief provision:
Congress' concern with the possibility that without some relief
Winchester Corporation might be out of business.181 The judge
also ignored Congress' decision to exempt corporate felons from
the appropriations ban. 182 According to Nelson, this is a significant
fact, since exemption of corporations from the ban meant that
"Congress [through use of the ban] essentially reverted to the orig-
inal scheme designed in 1968 [sic] to protect and assist corporate
felons."'1 83 Nelson is correct when he claims that Judge Fisher ig-
nored this history; the judge should have included it given the em-
phasis he himself placed in setting the record straight.
Nevertheless, Nelson's contention that these events mean that
Congress used the appropriations ban to return to the 1965 status
quo is not entirely convincing.184 Even in 1965, when the focus on
relief for corporate felons was at its height, Congress did not re-
strict the relief provision to corporations. Individuals were in-
cluded, as well. 85 Nevertheless, Nelson scores some points when
he criticizes Fisher for failing to take into account a failed Republi-
can attempt in 1995 to enact legislation that would allow felons to
apply for relief if they were willing to pay for the review by the
ATE. 186 The bill passed out of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee but was removed before a vote on the floor.1 87
180. Id.
181. See Nelson, supra note 82, at 567.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 566.
184. Griffin provides an alternative explanation for why Congress chose to exempt
corporations from the appropriations that is entirely consistent with the argument
that judicial review under the relief provision is still available to individuals. See Grif-
fin, supra note 85, at 1001-02.
185. See Nelson, supra note 82, at 554.
186. Id. at 567.
187. Id. at 556.
The last notable piece of legislative activity involving § 925(c) occurred in
1995. Republicans on the House Appropriations Committee attempted to
pass a provision that would have renewed an individual felon's ability to
apply for relief from their federal firearms disabilities. The provision would
have allowed felons to pay a fee to have the ATF review their application.
The provision passed out of committee, but the Appropriations Committee
removed it less than two weeks later. Although there does not appear to be
any discussion of the issue on the House floor, the media, including the
Washington Post, noted that the proposal "ran into heavy criticism from law
enforcement groups and gun-control activists," which resulted in its prompt
removal from further consideration.
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This 1995 legislative failure suggests that the central concern for
Congress was not to prevent ATF from wasting money; instead,
Congress passed the statute with some other purpose in mind. 188
Nevertheless, Judge Fisher stated, "[t]he only 'intent' that can be
understood from these reports is that Congress was concerned with
ATF's inefficient and wasteful administrative review process rather
than a desire to curb the availability of relief itself. '189
While the failed attempt to amend the appropriations ban by
placing the financial burden on the petitioner helps to undercut the
aforementioned portion of the district court's rationale, the judge
Id. (citations omitted).
188. Statements by Senator Paul Simon are often quoted by critics of judicial re-
view to indicate that: 1) the purpose of the appropriations ban is to keep guns out of
the hands of felons; and 2) that it was never the intent of Congress in enacting the ban
to permit the court to exercise judicial review.
[T]he appropriations statutes do not provide any more information that
could be construed as a grant of authority to the courts in the absence of an
ATF denial. Senator Paul Simon indicated as much in 1996 when he reaf-
firmed that "the goal of [§ 925(c)] has always been to prohibit convicted
felons from getting their guns back-whether through the ATF or the courts.
It was never our intention to shift the burden to the courts." Other congress-
men echoed Senator Simon's sentiments.
Id. at 572. (citations omitted); see Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,
227-28 (3d Cir. 2002).
Supporters of judicial review are quick to point out that Senator Simon's state-
ments were made during a failed effort in Congress to include a provision in the ap-
propriations ban specifically stating that:
The Committee has modified a continuing provision prohibiting the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms from acting upon applications for relief
from Federal firearms disabilities. The modification holds that refusal to act
upon such applications shall not be subject to judicial review for any felon
convicted of a violent crime, firearms violation, or drug related crime.
This provision was never adopted. H.R. Rep. No. 660, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1996). Nevertheless, there are statements contained in appropriations bans for other
years which suggest that judicial review was not contemplated by the drafters. H.R.
Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995) states, in pertinent part:
For the fourth consecutive year, the Committee has added bill language
prohibiting the use of Federal funds to process applications for relief from
Federal firearms disabilities. The Committee understands the controversial
nature of the underlying law allowing convicted felons to have their right to
own a firearm restored. However, those who commit serious crimes forfeit
many rights and those who commit felonies should not be allowed to have
their right to own a firearm restored. We have learned sadly that too many
of these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit
violent crimes with firearms. There is no reason to spend the Governments'
time or taxpayer's money to restore a convicted felon's right to own a
firearm.
This is just one of the problems with trying to interpret the meaning of a statute that is
renewed yearly.
189. Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
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also made the rather audacious suggestion that perhaps Congress
thought that courts would do a better job at determining who is
entitled to relief.190 "[A] court is a better-suited forum for deciding
these issues because it is adjudicative in nature." 191
Judge Fisher attempted to correct what he perceived as an injus-
tice to Bean-the fact that he was subject to firearms disabilities
without recourse to an ATF evaluation-by circumventing the ap-
propriations ban. 192 The lawfully enacted ban, however, not only
prohibits the ATF from investigating a claim for relief; from the
perspective of the relief statute, the ATF cannot provide the criti-
cal process and decision which are necessary to trigger the type of
remedy which Judge Fisher was so eager to provide.193 The words
"additional evidence," "judicial review," and "manifest injustice"
presume that the district court has something to consider other
than a mere letter to a petitioner stating that Congress prohibits
the ATF from acting on the petition. 194
Nevertheless, Judge Fisher felt compelled to act. In the subtext
of the opinion, the judge seems most concerned that an individual
who committed a minor, non-violent crime in a country that pro-
vided him with something less than due process can lose his liveli-
hood without any individual consideration of a claim that he is
entitled to relief. Judge Fisher's insistence that a court is just as
capable as an agency, if not more so, of making such an individual
determination is not hubris, but based on actual practice.
Under the provisions of the federal sentencing law, federal dis-
trict judges are often in a position to consider whether occupa-
tional disabilities are warranted with respect to certain convicted
felons. 195 For example, as a condition of probation or supervised
release, a sentencing court may impose occupational restrictions
upon a defendant. 196 These restrictions, however, must demon-
strate a "reasonably direct relationship" between the criminal con-
duct and the defendant's occupation and that they are "reasonably
necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe
that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage
190. Id. at 835.
191. Id. at 836.
192. See generally id.
193. See generally id.
194. See generally id.
195. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.5 (2002).
196. Id. § 5D1.3(e)(4).
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in conduct similar to that which the defendant was convicted. 1 97
That language of the standard which the judge must apply in deter-
mining whether a disability is appropriate is not significantly differ-
ent in substance from the test the ATF must apply in determining
whether to grant relief under § 925(c). 1 98 The ATF must decide if
the applicant "will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety." 199
It is easy to see why Judge Fisher believed that he was fully capa-
ble of considering whether Bean was entitled to retain his license.
If the ATF refused to act, the judge would do so. Certainly, noth-
ing in the appropriations ban specifically prohibited him from rul-
ing on the matter.2°° Unfortunately, the only authority he had was
contained in a statute that Congress effectively nullified.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 20 1 reversing its own deci-
sion in United States v. McGill,202 decided only five years before; it
relied extensively on the district court's legal and factual analysis.
In the opening page of the appeal court's opinion, the court tele-
graphed in not so subtle fashion that it was going to affirm.20 3 "The
facts of this case illustrate in caps underscored why Congress added
the relief provision to the Federal Firearms Act, giving certain con-
victed felons an avenue to regain the right to possess a firearm. "204
This focus on the relief provision-and implicitly Bean's circum-
stances-is curious and revealing. The issue before the court con-
cerned the validity of the McGill decision, which explored the legal
implications of the appropriations ban. 20 5 The merits of the relief
provision itself were never an issue.20 6 While the court did recog-
nize the validity of the government's argument that "ordinarily an
inferior court is not at liberty to disregard the mandate of a supe-
rior court,"207 it then suggested that this is no ordinary situation.20 8
The court explained that, in reviewing Judge Fisher's opinion, it
had to "examine carefully the reasons and analysis by the trial
197. See KUZMA, supra note 69, at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) and U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.5(b)).
198. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.5.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
200. Id.
201. Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001).
202. 74 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1996).
203. See Bean, 253 F.3d at 235-36.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 237-39.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 237.
208. Id.
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court, and our earlier decision in light of, notably, the intervening
passage of time and its effect."2 °9
The court relies less on intervening events, i.e., congressional re-
newal of the appropriations ban,210 and more on reconsideration of
its original finding that Congress repealed the relief provision when
it passed the ban.21 The court revisited legislative history, and
noted that during the period the appropriations ban was adopted, a
bill was introduced in the Senate to eliminate § 925(c) outright. 21 2
The proposed bill, called the Stop Arming Felons Act ("SAFE")
was never even reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.213
The fact that the 1992 SAFE bill was never enacted could not
have been news to the court, since McGill was decided in 1996; in
this case, however, it took on greater significance. It seemed to
demonstrate for the court that Congress deliberately chose the ap-
propriations route-as opposed to alternative methods-to deal
with perceived problems in the administration of the relief provi-
sion by the ATF.214 As the court put it, "[a]lthough it obviously
has the power, Congress has not enacted legislation eliminating or
amending section 925(c). ' 215
Therefore, Bean is still entitled to have a court review his appli-
cation for relief.
Section 925(c) was enacted for apparently valid reasons, and cit-
izens like Bean are entitled to the rights therein created and au-
thorized unless and until Congress determines to change
same .... We must now conclude that merely refusing to allow
the agency responsible for facilitating those rights to use appro-
priated funds to do its job under the statute is not the requisite
direct and definite suspension or repeal of the subject rights.
We further hold that when the BATF notified Bean that it
would not act on his petition, his administrative remedies de
facto were exhausted. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain this appeal.216
Without question, the Fifth Circuit was moved by Bean's predic-
ament. To what extent the facts of his particular case prompted the
court to overturn its own precedent is anyone's guess. It appears,
209. Id.
210. See id. at 239.
211. See generally id.
212. Id. at 237.
213. Id. at 237-38.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 238.
216. Id. at 239 (citation omitted).
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however, that the circumstances of Bean's case brought home to
the Court the full implications of a broad interpretation of the ap-
propriations ban. The Court seemed particularly troubled by the
fact that Bean, although barely a felon, 17 would lose his occupa-
tion as a result of it.218 In a footnote referring to Congress' deci-
sion to exempt corporations from the effects of the appropriations
ban, the Court found parallels between the circumstances faced by
corporations and those faced by Bean. 219 "[W]e are presented with
a situation that is virtually indistinguishable from that used to jus-
tify [corporate exemptions], i.e., absent the ability to possess and
sell firearms Bean will lose his business. '22 0 Finally, the Court con-
cludes its opinion with a particularly strong assertion that Bean is
entitled to relief.22
1
We are mindful of the serious concerns articulated about con-
victed felons regaining the right to possess firearms, and of the
need for congressional review and enhancement of the safe-
guards and procedures for appropriately accomplishing this ap-
parently worthy goal, but we are faced herein with the almost
incredible plight of Thomas Bean who, at most, was negligent in
not ensuring that his associates completely performed the sim-
ple task directed, and who served months in Mexican and U.S.
prisons for a simple oversight. We do not believe that any rea-
sonable observer is persuaded that his offense creates a likeli-
hood he represents a threat to the public's well-being, and it is
beyond peradventure to believe that Congress, or those seeking
to rescind § 925(c), intended for someone like Bean to lose his
livelihood on the basis of the facts such as are before us. Neither
equity nor the law require such an injustice. 22
217. See id. at 240.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 238 n.9.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 240.
222. Id. In their reply brief, petitioners take issue with the Court's conclusion that
Bean has lost his livelihood:
While [Bean] had a license to sell firearms before his felony conviction, he
earned his livelihood as a used car salesman both before and after his convic-
tion. [Bean] indicated in his testimony [during the hearing in District Court]
that he sought relief from firearms disabilities so that he would be able to
hunt.
Reply Brief for Petioners at 8, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-
704) (citation to Joint Record omitted).
This is beside the point. Bean sought to recover his dealer's license, not just his
right to possess firearms. His motive at the time of the hearing is interesting, but his
intent is what drives the legal claim. Paradoxically, the government is relying on testi-
mony at a hearing that it claims should never have taken place. Moreover, the extent
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On December 10, 2002, in one of the first decisions of the 2002-
03 Term, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,22 3 effectively ending Bean's ef-
forts to regain his license. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the
Court's terse decision.224 The Court ruled that the district courts
have no jurisdiction to consider such claims under the relief provi-
sion.221 Relying primarily on the language of § 925 (c), the Court
held that given that the ATF never actually denied Bean his re-
quested relief-due, of course, to the appropriations ban-the pre-
requisite for judicial review never occurred. 6 In other words, an
"actual adverse denial" by the Secretary of the Treasury must first
occur: inaction by the ATF does not amount to a "denial" under
the meaning of § 925(c).227
The opinion never delved into legislative history, and gave little
consideration to the purpose, legitimacy, or meaning of the appro-
priations ban. In fact, it expressed no concern with the ban, other
than taking it as a given.228 Instead, the Court focused almost en-
tirely on briefly explicating the judicial review provision contained
in the relief statute.229 In the language of the statute, Justice
Thomas found the answer to the question of what are the limits of
a court's authority when the Secretary fails to act due to an appro-
priations ban.23 ° Specifically, the answer lies in the very words of
the provision as well as in the procedures it mandates. With re-
spect to the language of the provision, the court found that the
term "denial by the Secretary" is inextricably linked to the decision
whether or not to grant the requested relief.23 1 Thus, "denial" can-
not mean the same as "inaction. 232 As the Court put it:
to which Bean earned his livelihood selling firearms was never considered by the
courts. Unquestionably, though, he was a licensed firearms dealer before his convic-
tion, and a felon unable to hold such a license after the conviction. Finally, a full
investigation by the ATF or a court could have taken into account any questions relat-
ing to the economic use Bean made of his license. The appropriations ban prevented
the former, while the government's position was that the latter was absolutely
prohibited.
223. United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002).
224. Id. at 585.
225. Id. at 587.
226. Id. at 588.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 585.
229. Id. at 585-88.
230. Id. at 587.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Grammatically, the phrase "denied by the Secretary" references
the secretary's decision on whether an applicant "will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety," and
whether "the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the
public interest." The determination whether an applicant is
"likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety" can hardly
be construed as anything but a decision actually denying the
application.233
Since such a denial presupposes this determination, "denial" can
only mean one thing-the Secretary has made a decision. The
Court was unmoved by Bean's argument that insofar as he was
concerned, refusal of relief has the same practical effect as a de-
nial.234 The Court's reliance upon the procedural aspects of the re-
lief provision-the other prong on which it based its opinion-also
led it to conclude that an "actual adverse decision" is a prerequisite
for review. 2 35 The Court noted that according to the relief provi-
sion, an applicant must first petition the "Secretary and establish to
the Secretary's satisfaction that the applicant is eligible for
relief."236
Furthermore, the Secretary has the authority to deny relief even
if an applicant fully satisfies all the requirements of § 925(C). 237
Since the Secretary is given such broad discretion as to deny relief,
even when the merits weigh in favor of the felon, "judicial re-
view.., cannot occur without a dispositive decision by the ATF. 238
For one thing, the Court noted, such a requirement follows from
the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). Judicial review of
administrative discretion is governed by the APA when no other
standard of review is set out.239 That is the case with the relief
provision. Moreover, under the APA judicial review is rather lim-
ited in scope. Judicial review is usually limited to determining
whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious an abuse of discre-
tion or otherwise not in accordance with law.24 °
In this case, the existence of the arbitrary and capricious test,
"contemplates review of some action by another entity, rather than
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 587-88.
240. Id.
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an initial judgment of the court itself."'24' How can a court deter-
mine if a decision is arbitrary and capricious if no decision is
rendered?
Second, the Court reasoned that the type of inquiry and analysis
that determine whether relief is appropriate are those that are typi-
cally allocated to the executive branch, not the judiciary.242
Whether an applicant is "likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety" presuppose an inquiry into that applicant's back-
ground-a function best performed by the Executive, which un-
like courts, is institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral,
wide-ranging investigation. Similarly, the "public interest" stan-
dard calls for an inherently policy-based decision best left in the
hands of an agency.243
The Court apparently ignored the irony inherent in its reasoning.
After all, the appropriations ban-which placed Bean in this co-
nundrum and led to the Court's consideration of this issue-was
passed in the wake of a scortching report that pilloried the ATF for
providing relief in a manner that was, in fact, detrimental to the
public interest.244 Congress expressed its own concern with judg-
ment calls made by the ATF in the most oblique way. 45 Third and
lastly, the Court considered that § 925(c), by its terms, limits a dis-
trict court's consideration of "additional evidence" of eligibility for
relief to very limited circumstances.246 A district judge exercising
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 588.
244. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text. Although the rate of recidi-
vism for those granted relief was rather low-2.6 percent-the crimes they allegedly
went on to commit were often very serious ones. It needs to be noted that for the
majority of these recidivists, the ATF did not keep track of the disposition of their
cases after arrest. The crimes included attempted murder, Attempted rape, sexual as-
sault, child molestation, and trafficking in cocaine. Id.
245. Under the relief procedure, ATF officials are required to determine
whether a convicted felon, including persons convicted of violent felonies or
serious drug offenses, can be entrusted with a firearm. After ATF agents
spend many hours investigating a particular applicant[,] they must determine
whether or not that applicant is still a danger to public safety. This is a very
difficult and subjective task that could have devastating consequences for in-
nocent citizens if the wrong decision is made. The Committee believes that
the approximately forty man-years spent annually to investigate and act
upon these investigations and applications would be better utilized to crack
down on violent crime. Therefore, the Committee has included language in
the bill which prohibits the use of funds for the ATF to investigate and act
upon applications for relief from federal firearms disabilities.
S. Rep. No. 353, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1992) (emphasis added).
246. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 588.
1792
2003] NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN 1793
judicial review can only admit such additional evidence where
"failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. '24 7 Thus,
a judge that admits essentially all the evidence in a hearing that
reviews an ATF decision is acting beyond the limits of § 925(c).
A judge must first consider the evidence already existing in the
record prepared by the ATF.z48 The term "review" signifies just
that; it does not allow a judge to grant relief based upon his evalua-
tion of the merits, "absent an antecedent actual denial by ATF.
' 249
It is difficult to take issue with the Court's decision that Bean
was not entitled to judicial review. Whether or not Congress actu-
ally intended to repeal or suspend § 925(c) through the appropria-
tions ban is, in reality, a moot question given the effect the ban had
upon the ATF's involvement. According to the most common un-
derstanding of these words in English language, it simply cannot be
said that "failure to consider" Bean's request for relief is
equivalent to a "denial. '250 Inaction is the opposite of action, not
its equivalent. In fact, the ATF explicitly told Bean that if funds
were ever released for them to resume investigations of requests
for relief, they would then consider his request .2 1 The end result
to Bean is, of course, the same-loss of his license. 252 Neverthe-
less, both the language of § 925(c), as well as its requirement of an
investigation conducted by the ATF strongly suggests that the right
to judicial review had not been triggered.253 The primary right con-
tained in § 925(c) is the right to a review by the ATF for relief from
firearms disabilities.2 5 4 The appropriations ban effectively elimi-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Because § 925(c) unequivocally makes a "denial" by ATF a jurisdictional
prerequisite, we must consider whether ATF's inability to act because of the
appropriations ban constitutes a "denial." We hold that it does not. "The
word 'denial' means an adverse determination on the merits." In contrast,
an inability to grant a request is not commonly understood to constitute a
"denial." See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 602 (3d ed.
1993) (defining a "denial" as a "refusal to grant, assent to, or sanction" or a
"rejection of something requested . .. ).
Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
ommitted).
251. Brief for Respondent at 37-38, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002)
(No. 01-704).
252. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.5 (2002).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
254. Id.
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nated that right.25 5 Judicial review assumes both the existence of
that right, and its denial.25 6 No review can take place without it.25 7
While the Supreme Court briefly reviewed the facts leading to
Bean's disability, it did not seem to be at all concerned by the mer-
its of his claim for relief before the ATF and the District Court. 8
Unlike the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the Court did not allow itself to be influenced in the least
by the peculiar facts of Bean's case in its interpretation of the relief
provision.2 5 9 The Court focused entirely on issues of law, not
equity.260
PART FOUR
The problem with the Bean decision is not that it was wrongly
decided; the problem is that the case even needed to be brought to
court in the first place. The culprit was the appropriations ban.
The Court was confronted with a scheme that turned a federal stat-
ute into a mirage. The Court had no choice but to treat it as such.
By using an appropriations ban to effectively nullify an other-
wise valid statutory, and seemingly enforceable, legislative provi-
sion, Congress comes up short. Putting aside the merits of the
relief provision, there is something not quite kosher about Con-
gress using its appropriations power to eliminate statutory disabil-
ity relief. At the very least it is hypocritical to retain a statute
which promises relief from a potentially serious collateral conse-
quence of conviction, and yet deliberately refuse to fund its
implementation.
The rationales for the appropriations ban are less than compel-
ling. One of several rationales, articulated during committee hear-
ings, is that the money spent by the ATF would be better spent
fighting violent crime. There are other methods, however, to con-
trol spending the ATF to investigate § 925(c) petitions. The statute
itself could be amended to correct this particular problem. For ex-
ample, Congress could limit the types of applicants eligible for re-
lief to nonviolent and/or first-time offenders. Such a revision of
the statute would significantly reduce the total number of appli-
255. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 585.
256. Id. at 588.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 585-86.
259. Id.; see Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234, 238-39
(5th Cir. 2001).
260. Bean, 123 S. Ct. at 587-88.
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cants, in view of the VPC report indicating that a large percentage
of serious felons actually receive relief.261 It could also impose a
waiting period before a felon is eligible for relief.262 Additionally,
the statute could require that petitioners for relief pay their own
costs for investigation.263
More to the point, budget constrainsts notwithstanding, Con-
gress has an affirmative duty to fund the ATF's statutory responsi-
bilities under § 925(c). It was Congress, after all, that chose to
impose firearms disabilities in the first place. 64 The relief provi-
sion-which was enacted after firearms disabilities were extended
to virtually all felonies-was the way in which Congress acknowl-
edged that not all felons who were rearmed were a threat to public
safety.265 The appropriations ban causes this self-correcting system
to cease functioning. Congress denied funding to correct an ineq-
uity it created itself by passing an overbroad firearms disability law.
The relief provision was not designed to provide the same type of
remedy that Congress creates when it seeks to fill a perceived so-
cial need in its capacity to provide for the general welfare of its
citizens; in that situation, Congress is attempting to solve a prob-
lem as well, but not one of its own making. In cases such as these,
where Congress creates the inequity, it should be far more con-
strained in denying relief.
The other rationale for the ban, that a decision by the ATF to
grant relief creates an unacceptable risk of harm to the public, is a
reason to repeal or amend the provision, not deny ATF appropria-
tions on a yearly basis.26 6 Congress chose not to repeal. Instead,
the ban was the preferred means to resolve a conflict over the re-
lief provision between gun control advocates and their oppo-
nents.267 After all, attempts at eliminating the relief provision
261. This strongly suggests that such felons make up a substantial number of appli-
cants. If not, we have the rather bizarre situation that the ATF is less likely to grant
relief to serious and violent felons than non-violent ones. See supra notes 96-107 and
accompanying text.
262. Currently, ATF regulations provide for a two-year waiting period from the
time of release. There is no reason that this could not be extended to five years or
more. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(d) (2003). Many states provide such waiting periods
before firearms privileges can be restored. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY,
supra note 21; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216, 225 (2002).
263. This is unlikely to occur. An attempt in Congress to amend the appropriations
ban to allow the ATF to investigate petitions of individuals willing to pay the costs
was defeated. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
264. Federal Firearms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922.
265. Id.
266. Nelson, supra note 82, at 558-59.
267. Id. at 562 n.92.
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outright had failed.268 While legislators are expected to engage in
compromise, particularly in one of the most controversial and con-
tentious of issues in Congress, the appropriations ban is not a genu-
ine compromise. It is more like the avoidance of compromise. It is
simply too easy for Congress to resolve an important issue of pub-
lic policy by using its appropriations power in this way. Every year
that the appropriations ban is renewed means one more year a true
resolution of the conflict over the merits of the relief provision can
be avoided. As a result, it seems that law itself is compromised.
According to one law stated in § 925(c), felons are entitled to be
considered for relief; yet, according to another law, the appropria-
tions ban, they are effectively prevented from seeking that relief.
Laws are often inconsistent, but in this case one law effectively ne-
gates the other. This disconnect can hardly be called a compromise.
Compromise or not, the method Congress chose to correct per-
ceived problems with the ATF's performance in carrying out its
responsibilities is less than ideal. It results in some unintended
consequences. For the felon, this type of de facto repeal of an ex-
isting statute hardly provides the notice that society expects of laws
concerning criminal matters. One's first notice of this "repeal"
would likely come in a response by the ATF that it has no funds to
investigate an individual's eligibility.269 While § 925(c) relief ap-
pears to be the law, it is merely an illusion; such a statute does little
to foster respect for the legal system.270 The continued existence of
the relief provision makes it appear as if relief is indeed still availa-
ble. For all these reasons, repeal or revision of the relief provision
would have been preferable to the appropriations alternative.271
Bean's loss of license may very well have been an unintended
consequence of the appropriations ban. It was inevitable, however,
that this type of situation would occur when all but corporate
268. Id.
269. United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584, 585-86 (2002).
270. Further, for those individuals who believe that permanent civil disabilities are
justified by their deterrent value, an appropriations ban is not likely to make them as
sanguine as the outright repeal of the relief provision. There is no deterrent benefit to
be gained from this method of making relief from firearms disabilities permanently
unavailable. While it can be argued that the absence of relief from civil disabilities
has little, if any, deterrent effect on behavior, it is axiomatic that whatever deterrent
effect it does have is reduced by the possibility-gleaned from reading § 925(c)-that
relief is apparently available.
271. As one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated when he questioned the
government's attorney during oral argument, "Why didn't [Congress] just repeal the
thing, then, because it didn't have the votes?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 12,
United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 01-704).
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felons were excluded from ATF relief by the appropriations ban.
The relief provision is part of a very extensive, complicated, and
somewhat arbitrary system of firearms disabilities. Congress, by
effectively eliminating this relief provision without adequately con-
sidering its impact in relation to the other provisions in the fire-
arms disability scheme, created an imbalance in the system. To the
extent that providing relief to felons is a problem that needs to be
addressed, it is a polycentric 272 one, such that correction of this one
aspect of the statutory scheme by simply eliminating it will inevita-
bly create consequences that may be unintended, undesirable, or
unfair.273
The relief provision, by its terms, functions much like a safety
net. It permits the ATF to consider each individual's particular cir-
cumstances.274 It is an ad hoc means to correct or reevaluate the
per se imposition of disabilities upon felons. The ATF can address,
on an individual basis, problems, anticipated or otherwise, not ad-
dressed elsewhere in the rather complex disabilities scheme.
A. The Adverse Impact of the Appropriations Ban
Upon Occupations
Without funds, the ATF is barred from considering the fact that
a felon is seeking to recover firearms relief in order to carry out an
272. A polycentric problem has been described as follow: "A polycentric problem
is one that cannot be solved on a step-by-step or issue-by-issue basis because decisions
as to each issue affect all the other issues. Instead, polycentric problems can only be
solved by addressing all the issues simultaneously." David Urban, Customs's Proper
Role in Strict Product's Liability Actions on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439, 450
(1990).
273. Justice Robert Jackson, writing in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948), provides an apt description of the types of problems which arise when an
attempt is made to correct a legal problem in isolation without regard to the structure
as a whole. Speaking in that case of the somewhat illogical system of rules governing
the admissibility of character evidence, he states:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession
that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and
compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a
poorly reasoned counter privilege to the other. But somehow it has proved
a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls
in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out
of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance
between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
Id. at 486. Much of what he states can be applied in the context of the firearms
disabilities scheme. The "misshapen stone" is, of course, the relief provision. His ad-
vice on a matter entirely unrelated to that scheme should have been considered by
Congress in 1992, before it acted, and should be considered by Congress now, because
it continues to pass the same ban on ATF funding on an annual basis.
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
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occupation-not just a hobby. Reviewing requests for relief on the
basis of occupational consequences resulting from firearms disabili-
ties has been an important function of the ATF. In the 1992 Vio-
lence Policy Center Report listing a sample of one hundred cases in
which the ATF granted firearms relief to convicted felons, eleven
of those applicants (including two corporations) sought relief in or-
der to pursue various occupations which required access to
firearms.275
Four of the felons were licensed federal firearms dealers, while
one of them sought such a license.276 Of the others, three appli-
cants wanted to be able to operate pawn shops (presumably involv-
ing guns): one needed a firearm because he had been elected a
state constable; another needed a firearm in order to work as a
hunting guide; and one needed a gun to protect his fish market
located in a rough neighborhood.277 The crimes for which these
applicants were convicted varied extensively: burglary, tax evasion,
drug dealing, manufacturing moonshine, illegally purchasing food
stamps, violating federal firearms licenses, making illegal campaign
contributions, killing a longhorn sheep, and abandonment of wife
and child.278 Most of these crimes were not considered serious
enough to warrant sentences longer than six months, if that. 79
One sentence for burglary was three years imprisonment: the felon
who served that sentence was eventually elected constable.28 °
The merits of the ATF's decision to restore firearms privileges to
these felons, or any one of them in particular, is not the present
issue. What these cases demonstrate is that a significant number of
felons face occupational disabilities as a result of firearms restric-
tions. Given the importance of maintaining legitimate employment
as a means to reduce recidivism, any fair consideration of the rela-
tive merits of a relief provision must take into account this impor-
tant function of such a provision.
Given the serious consequences which result from occupational
disabilities, it is particularly striking that the appropriations ban
specifically excludes corporate but not individual licensees from its
restrictions on ATF investigations. While not all individuals seek-
ing relief for occupational purposes are licensees, those that are-
275. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 96, § 3, at http://www.vpc.org/studies/Re-
liefthree.htm (last visited July 15, 2003).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
1798
2003] NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN 1799
like Bean-should expect to be treated in the same manner as cor-
porate ones.
Not only have the origins of the relief provision been traced to
Congress' concern with protecting firearms-related business inter-
ests-albeit corporate business interests281-but this concern has
carried over into the specific provisions of the current version of
the relief statute. 82 These provisions, in both the statute itself as
well as the ATF's regulations, single out all licensees, corporate,
and individual. The statute provides all licensees added protection
from the adverse effects of the federal firearms disabilities
generally.2 83
A licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector conducting operations under this chapter [18
USC §§ 921 et seq.], who makes application for relief from the
disabilities incurred under this chapter [18 USC §§ 921 et seq.],
shall not be barred by such disability, from further operations
under his license pending final action on an application for relief
filed pursuant to this section. 84
Although licensed dealers and manufacturers are covered by
both the disabilities and relief statutes, they are given preferential
treatment under the terms of the latter.285 In this regard, they en-
joy favored status. Under the terms of § 925(c), a typical felon
seeking relief has already been deprived of his privilege to possess
firearms.2 86 If he wants relief he has to petition the ATF.287 Only
if he obtains that relief is he then legally entitled to possess weap-
ons again.288 A licensed felon, however, can continue to conduct
his business even after conviction as long as he files a timely claim
for relief.289 According to ATF regulations, the dealer's claim for
relief has to be filed within thirty days of his conviction.2 90 He can
then continue to operate his business during the pendency of his
281. Like almost every other assertion made about the history of the firearms disa-
bility scheme, this one is hotly contested. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text. One can safely assume that at least some-if not all-of the motivation behind
the original 1965 relief provision was driven by concern for keeping Winchester in
business.
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 27 C.F.R. § 478.143 (2003).
290. Id. § 478.144(i)(1).
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application. If his relief is eventually denied, he still has thirty days
from the date of denial to conduct his business.2 9 1 Apparently, this
is designed so that he can wind down his business operations.292
Significantly, neither Congress, nor the ATF distinguishes be-
tween corporations and individuals when it comes to firearms
licensees or manufacturers.293 The impact of disabilities on either
is the same; individuals will be out of work. The fact that Congress,
in the relief statute, recognized the occupational implications of
disabilities to both licensed individuals and corporations renders
the appropriations ban with its sole corporate exemption rather in-
consistent.294 Why distinguish between the two types of felons,
placing Bean and other legitimate gun dealers into a categorical
limbo? One answer that has been tendered is that a corporate
felon is not a living, breathing entity, and thus not as likely to be a
danger if it is rearmed in the same way as an individual felon.295
This argument has some appeal, but its appeal is strictly superficial.
First, it fails to account for the fact that under the provisions of the
relief statute individual dealers had always been allowed to con-
tinue operating even after conviction, during the pendency of the
investigation for relief, and even for a short time after a denial for
relief. This provision not only argues for parity on historical and
statutory grounds, but also suggests that at least when it comes to
individual licensed dealers, there exists a presumption that they do
not pose as grave a threat to the public as other individuals. The
existence of the provision is also an implicit recognition that fire-
arms disabilities which impact occupations are more burdensome
than disabilities that do not.
Second, the appropriations ban fails to recognize that corpora-
tions can only commit felonies through the actions of their employ-
ees. 96 When Olin Mathieson, or any corporation for that matter,
291. Id.
292. United States v. Douglas, 974 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing
the "winding down" exception under 18 U.S.C. § 925(B)).
293. See 27 C.F.R. § 479.11. Under the statute, "person" is defined as "a partner-
ship, company, association, trust, estate, or corporation, as well as a natural person."
Id.
294. It has been argued, unsuccessfully, that this distinction between corporations
and individuals, generally, violates equal protection. See Burtch v. U.S. Dep't of Trea-
sury, 120 F.3d 1087, 1.090 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Congress could rationally have believed
that corporations guilty of corporate crime present less danger to the community than
do individual felons.").
295. Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090.
296. 1 KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A TREATISE ON
THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS 8 (2d
1800
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is convicted of a state or federal crime, its culpability is based on
derivative liability.297 In federal prosecutions, derivative liability is
based upon the principle of respondeat superior.298 In state prose-
cutions, it is usually some variation of the Model Penal Code ap-
proach.299 In any event, it means that some living, breathing
human being, or often beings-the very kind of beings that justify
the exclusion of individual licensed felons from the exemption in
the appropriations ban-committed a felony for which the corpo-
ration is being held accountable and for which it can lose its fire-
arms privileges. The individual employee, as well as the
corporation, are equally liable.3"' In reality, often the corporation
alone is charged because: 1) a corporation facing only a fine may
be more likely to plead guilty than an individual; or 2) the individ-
ual or individuals who committed the crime are unidentified; or 3)
the individual who is caught is only a minor official instead of the
actual corporate officer responsible.30 1 The point is that a particu-
lar individual, although guilty of a crime, sometimes avoids not
only punishment, but also firearms disabilities that follow.30 2 This
rather fine distinction between a corporate licensee and an individ-
ual licensee is hardly sufficient to warrant such disparate treatment
in an appropriations ban, particularly when the relief statute treats
them identically.
ed. 1991) ("Corporate liability for crime is derivative liability in the sense that the acts
and intent of corporate officers and agents are imputable to the corporate entity.").
297. See id. In the Olin Mathieson case, there was a conviction of an "associated
individual," as well. 368 F.2d 525, 525-26 (1966).
298. KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS 27 (2d ed. 1995) ("The only general limitation on corporate liability
under the respondeat superior rule is that the agent who commits the crime must be
acting within the scope of his or her authority and on behalf of the corporation.").
299. The Model Penal Code takes a more conservative approach, requiring general
involvement in the illegal activity by a "high managerial agent." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.07 (1)(c).
300. In United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962), the individual defendant in a
Sherman Act prosecution against both him and his corporation unsuccessfully argued
that since the Act defines "person" to include corporations it must therefore exclude
individuals acting on its behalf. The Court was unreceptive to this absurd argument.
Id. at 407.
301. See generally FRANCES CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK
351-53 (1987).
302. Interestingly, even if the agent is acquitted of the underlying criminal conduct,
the corporation can still be convicted. See 1 BRICKEY, supra note 296, at 10. ("Not-
withstanding that corporate liability for crime is predicated upon ascribing the acts
and intent of corporate agents to the corporation, however, corporate criminal liabil-
ity is not contingent upon conviction of the wrongdoing agent.").
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Thus, while corporations are different than individuals, it is not a
significant difference for relief purposes. There is no real differ-
ence between a corporate officer in a firearms factory-who eludes
culpability by shifting it to the corporation-and a licensed gun
dealer who is seeking relief.
Congress, in designing the appropriations ban, reasoned other-
wise. Nowhere else does this distinction appear to exist. At the
very least, the appropriations ban should have remained consistent
with the structure of the relief provision, and included all licensed
felons, corporate as well as individual.30 3 Indeed, given the detri-
mental effect the ban will have on those individuals seeking relief
from firearms disabilities for occupational purposes who are not
licensed, Congress could justifiably include those individuals as
well in the exemption from the ban. It would be consistent with
Congress' concern with occupational relief in the statute. Using
the data in the VPC report, one can speculate that these individu-
als would comprise only about ten percent of the number of peti-
tions filed for relief that had been filed in the past;304 that number
would be a far more manageable group, less of a drain on ATF
resources, and more worthy of consideration.
B. The Adverse Impact Upon Relief From Illegitimate
Foreign Convictions
The appropriations ban denies the ATF another particularly im-
portant responsibility under the relief provision-evaluation of the
validity of a foreign conviction.30 5 This responsibility was thrust
upon the ATF by the prevailing federal case law that foreign con-
victions fall within the purview of the federal disabilities statute.
The rationale for the rule that the term "any court" in the fire-
arms disability statute 30 6 includes foreign as well as domestic courts
303. The exemption for corporations in the appropriation ban is not, by its terms,
limited to corporate licensees. Nevertheless, it would be odd if Congress had an inter-
est in exempting non-licensed corporations from the ban, particularly in view of the
history of the relief provision and its role in saving Winchester. It is possible, how-
ever, that a corporate felon not involved in the sale, distribution, or manufacturing of
firearms might seek relief so that it can, for example, continue to arm its security
guards. Nevertheless, the exemption of all corporations from the appropriations ban
does not diminish an individual licensee's claim for favored treatment given the terms
of the statute.
304. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
305. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
306. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2003):
"It shall be unlawful for any person ...
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is expressed well in one of the leading cases in this area, United
States v. Winson.30 7 The court held:
Since the object of the statute is to prevent the possession of
firearms by individuals with serious criminal records, we can
perceive no reason why the commission of serious crimes else-
where in the world is likely to make the person so convicted less
dangerous than he whose crimes were committed within the
United States. Moreover, we do not perceive any congressional
intent to exclude from the Act's coverage a class of felon whose
unlawful conduct occurred outside of this country.3 °8
It is difficult to argue with the contention that an individual who
has committed violent crimes in a foreign country is less likely to
be a threat than someone who committed the same crime in the
United States. Cases that have dealt with the issue of foreign con-
victions in the context of firearms disabilities almost always involve
defendants convicted of serious crimes in those countries.
While courts recognize that a foreign conviction may have been
obtained in violation of the defendant's civil rights or contrary to
[a] cherished principle of American constitutional law, '30 9 they
have relied upon § 925(c) as the method by which a foreign felon
can assert that his conviction was unlawfully obtained. 311 This
should be done, the Supreme Court noted, before the foreign felon
attempts to obtain a firearm. 311
The relief provision, by its terms, is broad enough to fully assay
the validity of a foreign conviction, and the necessity of imposing
firearms disabilities. The ATF can take into account that a foreign
felony conviction was for a relatively minor offense by American
standards.312 This was the case with Bean's conviction. It was also
significant that the crime was eventually reduced to a misde-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
307. 793 F.2d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 1986).
308. Id. (citations omitted).
309. Id. at 757.
310. Id. at 758.
311. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1980) ("It seems fully apparent to
us that the existence of [18 U.S.C. § 925] suggests that Congress clearly intended that
the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress'
purpose 'broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as po-
tentially irresponsible and dangerous.'") (citation omitted).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
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meanor.313 The crime with which Bean was charged in Mexico may
not have required mens rea, a fundamental element of felonies in
the United States.
The ATF could also consider the means used to obtain the con-
viction, i.e., whether it was obtained in a manner consistent with
fundamental fairness or basic notions of due process. 314 Such an
inquiry would include an examination of the conduct of foreign of-
ficials during the investigative stage of the criminal proceedings, as
well as during the trial stage. For example, a confession may have
been obtained through subterfuge, brutality, or other questionable
methods. The ATF could also consider whether the sentence and
subsequent punishment comported with evolving standards of
human decency.
To impose a civil disability upon an individual who can make a
credible claim that his conviction violates basic norms of state con-
duct would render our system somewhat complicit in the barbaric
conduct leading to conviction. After all, without the conviction-
which may never have survived an appeal in the United States-
there would be no basis for the disability. If the conviction is ren-
dered unreliable as well, not unusual where the suspect is denied
basic rights, a stronger case would be made for relief.
In the Bean case, for example, District Court Judge Fisher found
that Bean was essentially compelled to confess when he was forced
to sign a document he could not understand. 1 5 In the United
States, such a confession would surely be suppressed. The alleged
absence of a trial or some other judicial proceeding giving Bean an
opportunity to be heard would be another important considera-
tion.316 Given the appropriations ban, however, Bean and others
like him are left with a compelling argument of injustice without a
forum such as the relief provision to advance it. He was denied a
forum in Mexico; and now is denied one in the United States.
This opportunity was critical for any foreign felon considering
either entering a profession where firearms are necessary, or
merely seeking to obtain a firearm for other lawful purposes. The
reason is not only because foreign felons are subject to firearms
disabilities, but also because a defendant charged as "a felon in
313. Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234, 236 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2001).
314. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
315. See Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837-38 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
316. Id.
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possession" cannot claim he is not a "felon" because his earlier
conviction was invalid.317
Since this alternative is no longer available, a foreign felon is
unable to obtain relief from disabilities caused by an invalid for-
eign conviction; assuming the foreign conviction is valid, he cannot
even obtain a denial by the ATF which would at least put him on
notice that he is subject to criminal penalties if he violates the fire-
arms disability provision. In either case, he is presumptively a
felon.
Thus, the appropriations ban wreaks havoc upon a judicial
scheme which resolves to balance the goal of preventing dangerous
foreign felons from possessing weapons against a foreign felon's
right not to be bound in the United States by convictions obtained
through unacceptable foreign conduct.
Individuals like Bean are particularly prejudiced by the inability
to seek relief from foreign convictions created by the appropria-
tions ban. Not only is he especially harmed because his occupation
is on the line, but also because the circumstances of his conviction
as well as the relatively minor nature of his crime make him an
ideal candidate for relief.318
C. Exceptions and Exemptions: The Futility of the
Appropriations Ban
Prior to its nullification by the appropriations ban, the relief pro-
vision partially managed to alleviate the inequitable, inconsistent
and ineffectual treatment of felons under the federal firearms disa-
bilities scheme. 319 The firearms disabilities statute contains some
very formidable exceptions and exemptions. By virtue of the ap-
propriations ban, not only is unequal treatment exacerbated, but
Congress has also effectively eliminated a relatively innocuous re-
lief provision, all the while retaining major exceptions that signifi-
cantly undermine the fundamental purpose of the federal
disabilities scheme-keeping guns out of the hands of violent and
317. Id.
318. If Bean's claim were ever to be considered by the ATF, disability relief would
probably be granted. If one were to compare the circumstances surrounding Bean's
conviction with the circumstances of the one-hundred felons referred to in the VPC
report, all of whom were granted relief, Bean would rank among the most deserving
of relief. Domestic felons-those convicted in state or federal court-have numerous
ways to challenge their convictions through the appeals process. A felon convicted in
a foreign country may not. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 96.
319. Nelson, supra note 82, at 554-55.
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dangerous felons. What follows is a description of those exemp-
tions and exceptions unaffected by the appropriations ban.
1. White Collar Crime Exemption
By definition, not all felons are subject to the federal firearms
disabilities. One group exempted is individuals convicted of cer-
tain white-collar offenses.32 ° One can argue that this is justified
because this category of felons is so unlikely to engage in violent
crimes that they do not need to have their firearms rights removed.
The trouble with this rationale is that not all white-collar felons are
included within the statutory exemption. Tax fraud, for example, a
paradigmatic white-collar crime, is not covered by the exemption.
In the statistics gathered by the VPC, a significant number of appli-
cants were convicted of tax-related felonies as well as other white-
collar crimes.32' This inconsistency, however, was somewhat ame-
liorated by the former availability of the relief provision.
As a consequence of the appropriations ban, an inconsistency in
the law now appears to be an injustice. Felons convicted of unex-
empted white-collar crimes have no avenue for relief. Their coun-
terparts do not even need relief. They have suffered no disability
from the very start.
Not only are certain white-collar criminals subject to the appro-
priations ban, but also so are other individuals convicted of other
non-violent or minor felonies.322 If the rationale for exempting
some categories of felons from disabilities due to the non-violent
nature of their crimes is a valid one, there appears to be no princi-
pled reason not to exempt virtually all white-collar crimes as well
as non-violent crimes as well. Given that such felons have no re-
course to the relief provision under the current appropriations ban,
perhaps now is the time for Congress to exempt those individuals
from the appropriations ban or the disabilities statute itself. This
should be done for the sake of consistency, if nothing else.
It is, however, unlikely to happen. According to the VPC report,
even individuals who had been convicted of non-violent felonies
went on to commit more serious crimes after obtaining firearms
relief.323 Given the enormous influence of this report upon Con-
320. The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"
does not include, "(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations,
unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the reg-
ulation of business practices .... " 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2003).
321. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 96.
322. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
323. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 96.
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gress' decision to enact the appropriations ban in the first place, it
is hardly likely that Congress would remove a substantial portion
of felons from the operation of the ban. This leaves only one ques-
tion: given the unpredictability of criminals, non-violent as well as
violent, how can Congress justify exempting any felons, even
white-collar ones, from the firearms disabilities statute?
2. Law Enforcement Exemption
Another exception to the disability provision is in cases where
the felon receives his firearm from a governmental agency.324 The
purpose of this exception is to allow states or the federal govern-
ment to arm employees who are otherwise barred by the federal
disabilities provision.325 This exception is used when state or fed-
eral laws permit felons to seek to become or remain police officers,
prison guards, probation officers, or other types of peace officers.
The very existence of this exception demonstrates that Congress
was not only aware that firearms disabilities can have devastating
consequences upon one's profession, but also felt prompted to pro-
vide relief to those individuals. Congress could also have been
prompted to enact this exception by a desire to provide the govern-
ment discretion to hire whomever it wishes to perform law enforce-
ment duties.
3. Exception for State Restoration of Civil Rights
In theory, the federal firearms disability statute applies to virtu-
ally all felons. Nevertheless, there is quite a large exception. Ac-
cording to § 921(a)(20), individuals who have had their "civil rights
restored" are no longer covered by the disabilities provision, unless
the "restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person
may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. ' '326 This ex-
324. The provisions of this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 921-29] .... shall not apply
with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importa-
tion of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued
for the use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or any
State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 925 (a)(1).
325. Id.
326. (20) The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year" does not include ...
Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a
person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not
be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such
pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly pro-
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ception for restoration of civil rights significantly limits the number
of felons actually covered by federal firearms disabilities. 327
For a felon convicted in federal court, only a pardon will restore
his firearms privileges-a rare occurrence indeed.328 For state
felons, however, the prospect of restoration of firearms privileges is
far brighter. Although some states impose a lifetime firearms ban
upon felons, unless a pardon is issued, a number of other states
have provisions for the restoration of civil rights which include fire-
arms privileges. 329 Restoration can occur automatically, upon re-
lease from sentence or after a waiting period, or it can occur as a
result of an administrative hearing.330 Some states, in fact, have no
civil disabilities at all; thus, there are no rights to restore.331 While
some states limit restoration of state firearms privileges to non-vio-
lent crimes, others have no such limitations.332
Thus, an individual convicted of a felony in a state where fire-
arms disabilities are lifted upon release from prison will not be sub-
jected to federal firearms disabilities either. His counterpart in a
state where state firearms disabilities are permanent will, in addi-
tion to state firearms disabilities, be subject to federal firearms dis-
abilities.333 One very tangible consequence of this disparity is that
only in the latter case will the individual be charged with the fed-
eral firearms crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm if he
happens to go hunting one day.334
vides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.
Id. § 921(a)(20).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-
704), lists fourteen states where firearms rights are restored automatically, and five
states where firearms rights can be restored by judicial action. Id. App. For a com-
prehensive listing of state laws regarding restoration of firearms disabilities, see OF-
FICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 21.
330. See Brief for Respondent, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 (2002) (No. 01-
704).
331. See id.; see also Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, Statutory Limitations
on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 0000, 0000
(2003).
332. OFFICE OF THE PARDON AVORNEY, supra note 21.
333. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
334. The statute states, in part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
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What does this mean in the context of a Bean-type scenario?
Had Bean been convicted of a felony in Vermont-where there are
no firearms disabilities-he would have retained his federal fire-
arm's dealer's permit. While § 925(c) hardly corrected the imbal-
ance caused by this statutory exception, it could correct the most
blatant inequities caused by a disabilities scheme that penalizes you
only if you are convicted of a crime in the wrong jurisdiction.
The most significant point about the civil rights restoration pro-
vision is that state law determines whether an individual is to be
subjected to a federal firearms scheme. Not only does this compro-
mise uniformity, it also promotes unequal treatment among felons.
Whether a felon is subject to a federal disability, and the related
criminal statutes, is determined by the vagaries of state law! Prior
to the adoption of the appropriations ban, all felons were at least
provided a means to seek relief from disabilities regardless of their
individual state's law. The effective elimination of the relief provi-
sion meant that this method for leveling the playing field no longer
exists.
In view of the appropriations ban, this major exception is partic-
ularly problematic. It directly puts into question the efficacy of the
federal disability scheme. For example, because state restoration
laws vary, federal firearms disabilities do not apply uniformly.335
Therefore, the purpose for which they were passed (keeping guns
out of the hands of violent felons) can only be accomplished hap-
hazardly at best. However misguided the ATF's decisions in indi-
vidual § 925(c) petitions, which prompted the ban, it could never
come as close to defeating the purpose of the firearms disabilities
scheme as that achieved by this, the wholesale exception for all
felons living within particular states.
The numbers signify this. The ATF restored approximately
7,000 licenses in a five-year period.336 Given that hundreds of
thousands of felons are released every year337 -some to states
which automatically restore civil rights, the number of felons who
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.
335. See Brief for Respondent at 45 n.19, United States v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584
(2002) (No. 01-704) (citing Morning Edition: BATF Felon Gun Program A Campaign
Issue? (NPR radio broadcast, July 30, 1992)).
336. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
337. Currently, approximately 600,000 felons are released from prison each year.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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have had firearms rights restored under § 925(c) is a miniscule per-
centage of the total.338
Before the appropriations ban was enacted, the relief provision
ameliorated some of these problematic aspects of the federal disa-
bility scheme; the appropriations ban only exacerbates it. If Con-
gress were truly determined to eliminate a "second chance club"
for felons,339 the elimination of this exception would have had a
much greater impact than the ban. Likewise, if Congress were gen-
uinely troubled with the ATF's arbitrary decisions, they should
have been more concerned with the procedures states used when
restoring civil rights to felons. More troublesome even are states
that automatically restore civil rights. Congress was clearly aware
of the problem created by state procedures for restoration of civil
rights. 4° In fact, members of Congress on several occasions sought
to modify the exception for felons who have had their civil rights
restored.34' All such efforts have been unsuccessful.342 As it
stands, Congress will apparently trust state administrative bodies-
over whom they have little authority-to correctly determine
which felons are entitled to federal relief, but not their own agen-
338. See Brief for Respondent at 45 n.19, Bean (No. 01-704) (citing Morning Edi-
tion: BATF Felon Gun Program A Campaign Issue?, supra note 335) (reporting view
of then-Representative Charles Schumer, chair of the House Committee overseeing
ATF that "the bigger problem is not the BATF program... but that many states have
their own programs to re-arm felons. Tens of thousands get their gun rights back
automatically as soon as their sentences are complete."); David C. Morrison, How
Even the Strange Can Get Rearmed, NAT'L J., Mar. 21, 1992, at 702 (reporting ATF
official's statement that "the real problem lies not in Washington but in state
capitals ... because convicted felons whose civil rights have been restored by state
laws are exempted from the gun ban.").
339. That is the term used by the VPC for the relief provision. Needless to say, it is
a pejorative one. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 96.
340. "Congress also was fully aware of the effect of [state restoration provisions] in
the debates over the appropriations measures, but notably did not adopt proposals to
repeal that provision." Brief for Respondent at 45, Bean (No. 01-704) (citations
omitted).
341. See id. For example, in 2000, an effort was made to amend the civil rights
restoration provision contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) to exclude felons who have
been convicted of serious drug offenses or violent felonies. Moreover, before any
eligible felon will be excused from the firearms disabilities statute, "the authority that
grants ... the restoration of civil rights ... expressly authorizes the person to ship,
receive, and possess firearms; and expressly determines that the conviction and the
person's record and reputation are such that the person is not likely to act in a man-
ner that is dangerous to the public safety, and that the granting of the relief is not
contrary to the public interest." Brief for Respondent at app., Bean (No. 01-704)
(quoting ENFORCE Act, S.2338, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (2000)). Interestingly,
states would have been bound by the same standard that applied to felons under the
federal relief provision.
342. See Brief for Respondent at 45, Bean (No. 01-704).
1810
2003] NO GUNS OR BUTTER FOR THOMAS BEAN 1811
cies. That, of course, assumes that an administrative decision is
even necessary. The United States Supreme Court held that in
those states where state civil rights are automatically restored, no
specific state determination of rehabilitation is needed before a
felon falls within the exception contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20).343
The white collar and law enforcement exemptions also put into
question the legitimacy and fairness of firearms disabilities. From
an occupational standpoint, the scheme explicitly allows an individ-
ual felon to pursue some occupations involving firearms, but not
others. Moreover, non-violent felons are not all treated equally;
some are specifically exempted, while others are placed in the same
category for disabilities purposes as dangerous felons. Not even all
white-collar felons are treated equally!
CONCLUSION
The ability to work in our society cannot be overestimated. This
is even more true for individuals with a criminal background. To
deny a felon access to an occupation solely by virtue of his status is
unfair. It is unfair to Thomas Bean; it is unfair to every other felon
as well.
Thus, while in some ways the circumstances leading to Thomas
Bean's loss of license are rather unique, the most critical aspects of
his case are emblematic of the inherent nature of many occupa-
tional disabilities. His disability was imposed automatically, by the
operation of a statute. There was no requirement of a nexus be-
tween the nature and circumstances of his conviction and the disa-
bility imposed. His only means of regaining his license was a
statutory provision that allowed him to petition the ATF for relief.
Since 1992, however, Congress has prohibited the ATF from using
any of its appropriated funds to investigate such petitions.
This appropriations ban, which has been renewed annually, was
a political compromise-or, arguably, a failure of compromise-
between those in Congress who wanted to eliminate the relief pro-
vision outright, and those who sought to retain it.
343. Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 313 (1998).
Nothing in the text of § 921(a)(20) requires a case-by-case decision to re-
store civil rights to this particular offender. While the term 'pardon' con-
notes a case-by-case determination, 'restoration of civil rights' does not.
Massachusetts has chosen a broad rule to govern this situation, and federal
law gives effect to its rule. All Courts of Appeals to address the point agree.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Although there is an exemption for corporate felons in the ap-
propriations ban, there is none for individuals for whom the ability
to possess firearms is necessary for their livelihood.344 Congress, in
its rush to correct one problem-the ATF's alleged mishandling of
its discretion by granting relief to dangerous felons-has created
another one. Individuals who might otherwise qualify for relief
under a more restrictive application of the relief provision are
lumped into the same group as violent career criminals who have
no legitimate occupational need to possess firearms. In enacting
the appropriations ban, Congress has cast too wide of a net.345
The Fifth Circuit expressed its dismay that Congress seemed to
cut off the only remedy available to Bean when it enacted the ap-
propriations ban.346 Therefore, they provided him with a rem-
edy.347 They were criticized by their colleagues on the Third
Circuit for acting out of sympathy for Bean:
The Bean panel repeatedly expressed sympathy for the felon
whose application was at issue. For instance, it said that because
the felon was a licensed firearms dealer prior to his conviction, it
would be "inequitable" for him to be unable to resume his busi-
ness while a corporation that sells firearms may seek relief
under § 925(c). However, the panel did not cite the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rejection in Burtch of a felon's contention that Congress
violated the Equal Protection Clause by distinguishing between
individual and corporate applicants. Nor did it cite the Supreme
Court's statement that "Congress could rationally conclude that
any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a suffi-
cient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm." It
appears that the Bean panel was frustrated that Congress left
§ 925(c) intact but barred individual felons from taking advan-
344. There are other inconsistencies in the overall disabilities scheme. Although
there is an exemption in the disabilities statute itself for some white collar crimes,
there is no exemption for those who commit minor, non-violent crimes. Although
there is an exception for felons who receive their firearms through official channels so
they can continue to be peace officers, there is no exception for individuals who wish
to engage in private occupations requiring access to weapons. Finally, although there
is an exception for individuals who have had their civil rights restored, there is no
exception for those convicted in foreign countries in violation of their civil rights.
345. While being a licensed gun dealer may not be a favored occupation, it is a
lawful occupation nonetheless.
346. Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir.
2001.)
347. Id.
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tage of the statute's relief provision by (seemingly perpetually)
continuing the appropriations ban.348
The Pontarelli court was correct on the law, as the Supreme
Court would soon confirm. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion plainly reveals an intuitive sense of injustice whenever the law
arbitrarily denies an individual his occupation merely because he is
a felon. The fact that the injustice does not amount to a constitu-
tional violation does not make it acceptable. It falls into a gray
area of bad legislation, where many other occupational disabilities
reside.
In his concurrence in Pontarelli, Judge McKee noted the incom-
patibility between the appropriations ban and the relief provision.
Congress "created a situation that leaves the jurisdictional grant
[contained in the relief provision] in place while making its exercise
absolutely impossible. ' 349 For individuals, the tension between the
two laws is also problematic. They are placed in a kind of sus-
pended legal state.
Accordingly, persons seeking relief from the federal firearms-
disability can still petition the Secretary for relief from that disa-
bility under § 925(c). No one suggests that Congress repealed
that portion of the statute. Rather, Congress has placed the ap-
plicant as well as the courts in a Catch 22 reminiscent of a Kafka
novel. °
Mixed literary allusions aside, Judge McKee effectively makes
his point. To those for whom firearms disabilities mean an end to
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, this is more than problematic. It
is unconscionable.
348. Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 285 F.3d 216, 224 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002) (cita-
tions omitted). This type of criticism has been made elsewhere.
349. Id. (McKee, J., concurring).
350. Id. at 236 (McKee, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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